Friday, December 19, 2008

The Negative Effects of Globalization in Latin America

The Negative Effects of Globalization in Latin America
Since the 1980s, globalization has changed drastically both negatively and positively the life of millions of people around the world, and Latin America has not escaped this change. Globalization is not new, it “can be traced back at least to the 15th century, with the genesis of the capital world economy and the geographic expansion of division of labor, access to raw materials, industrial production, and the circulation of capital.”
[1] However, in the last 30 years, the process of globalization has increased in an unprecedented speed, and today, it involves so many reforms that simply some governments are unable to adjust themselves to these policies, and as a result governments see their sovereignty and power vanish away.
Unlike in the past, today, “globalization is a process that affects the traditional territorial political space and its associated claim to sovereignty. It represents an increase and intensification or worldwide connectedness, with some decline on the significance of territoriality and state structures.”
[2]
In order to better understand these changes, this paper is designed to analyze the impact that globalization has in Latin America; to point out its negative effects, to criticize its policy requirements, and to understand the neoliberal policies promoted by the Washington Consensus (WC), and multinational corporations (MNCs), and specially the “structural adjustment policies” (SAPs) that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB), promote when assisting Latin American economic problems.
All over the world, - including the developed countries - but especially in Latin America, globalization has been accelerating social polarization. “This occurs when an increased percentage of national income or wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few people.”
[3] Polarizing in Latin America is evident, for example, according to the WB, “about 46 percent of Latin American population fell below the poverty line and 22 percent below the indigence line in 1990, as compared to 41 percent and 19 percent in 1980.”[4]
How can poverty increase despite all the potential benefits of globalization? What has Latin America done that the benefits of globalization are not coming to its people? Who are responsible for the region’s economic problems? The governments? The structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the WB? The neo-liberal policies promoted by the “Washington Consensus”? Or a mixture of all? To answer these questions, it is necessary to take a close look of the impact of the neoliberal policies promoted by the “Washington Consensus”, and the structural adjustment policies promoted by the IMF, and the WB since the 1980s.
The effects of globalization in Latin America can be felt in three different areas. First, the economy, whereby social arrangements for the production, exchange distribution, and consumption of goods and services take place. Second, the polity, involving the organized exchange of coercion and surveillance coupled with institutional transformations. And third, the cultural, where we see the social arrangements for the production, exchange and expression of symbols that represent meaning, beliefs, tastes and values.
[5]
Although the cultural effects of globalization are very important, in this paper the aim is to analyze and concentrate more in the effects of globalization in the economic and political areas.
Latin American governments adopted the policies of the “Washington Consensus” in the final years of the 1980s as a reaction to the macroeconomic crisis that hit the region and some other developing regions during this time. In the mid of such crisis, the “Washington Consensus” seemed to offer a strategy for development, and its “policies focused on minimizing the role of the government, emphasizing privatization, trade and capital market liberalization, and deregulation. Governments had a role in maintaining macro-stability, but the attention was on price stability rather than output stability, employment or growth. There was a large set of dos and don’ts; do privatize everything, from factories to social security; don’t have the government involved in promoting particular industries; do strength property rights; don’t be corrupt. Minimizing government meant lowering taxes – but keeping budgets in balance.”
[6]
Then, it is evident, that Latin America adopted the “Washington Consensus” because as high inflation broke out in many of the countries, its policies focused on fighting high inflation and other financial problems. For Latinos, their governments have not been working well, and the appeal that the WC’s policies would minimize the role of the government made them desirable. But soon the negative effects of these policies were felt.
Argentina a country that adopted the WC’s policies in its totality was praised, and the IMF together with the WB claimed credit for the revitalization of the Argentina’s economy. But, as it turned out, the growth was not sustainable. Growth was based on heavy borrowing from abroad, and on privatization which sold off financial assets to foreigners – the proceeds from which were not invested. There was a consumption boom. GDP was increasing, but national wealth was diminishing. Growth was to last a short seven years, and was to be follow by recession and stagnation.
[7]
Argentina is not the only country that adopted the WC’s policies in Latin America. Neo-liberalism came to Bolivia in 1985, when the government privatized most state-owned industries, and cut social services. Although manufacturing grew during this time, it soon became fragmented and decentralized into small workshops, therefore, destroying the once powerful unions. Between 1989 and 1996, the number of permanent jobs dropped from 71 percent to just 29 percent of all employment. But despite all these negative effects, the IMF praised Bolivia as one of Latin America’s best examples of globalization.[8] Twenty years later, Bolivia is the poorest country in South America.
The application of structural adjustment policies in Latin America is polarizing the region in several major areas. First, unemployment rates have grown dramatically as public sector employment is cut and domestic companies are forced to downsize their workforce in the face of increase international competition in local economies. Second, downward pressure on wage-labor rates as a consequence of globalization tends to reduce the real minimum wage and thus the level of household income for the majority. Third, the urban formal economy continues to shirk in many of the region’s largest cities and the informal economy has expanded as structural adjustment programs bring greater production flexibility to the marketplace. Fourth, agricultural policies that are export-oriented and geared toward production rationalization are exacerbating the marginalization of the rural poor. And fifth, the time-space compression technologies that drive globalization are accessible generally to the elite segment of society and not to the poorer majority.
[9]
Today, it is evident that “the economic restructuring, liberalization, technological changes, and fierce competition, both in the markets for goods and labor, that went with globalization have contributed to increased impoverishment, inequalities, work insecurity, weakening of institutions and social support systems, the erosion of social identities and values. Liberalization and reduced protection of agriculture, by reducing agriculture supplies, the price of food, and the amount of money that food importing countries pay for their imports has increased.
[10]
In Latin America, the neoliberal policies of the WC, the IMF, and the WB have had a profound negative effect. For example, fiscal adjustment which is part of the IMF structural adjustment program has mainly been implemented at the cost of social expenditure, even though some Latin American countries dedicated 18 percent of GDP to their social budget and most of them less than 10 percent.[11]
The global operations of multinational corporations (MNCs) have played a major role in the expansion of international trade and the emergence of regional trading blocs since the 1980s.
[12] Yet, despite the record profits that these MNCs have made in the last few years, investment in Latin America has not grown as much as inequality has. If the objective of the MNCs is to maximize profits as some people claim,[13] then, a national government must have the power to regulate these MNCs and be able to channel some of the profits to the benefit of its people. But, according to the neo-liberal policies, a government must play a minor role in regulating the market, because it is assumed that the market regulates itself.
The idea behind neo-liberalism is that the market operating freely and unencumbered by regulations, will allocate resources more efficiently than the state is able to, and it is assumed that this ultimately will benefit everyone, including the poor.
[14] However, after almost thirty years that Latin America opened up to the neoliberal policies there is no evidence that the market is regulating itself, instead as it was stated before, there is polarization, poverty is growing, and resentment towards globalization and the policies implemented by the IMF, the WB and other international Organizations (IO) can be seen all over the region, to the point that in the last seven years a good part of the region has turn to the left, which has been promising to regulate the role of MNCs, and financial institutions in the region.
The new leaders in Latin American have been reacting to the neo-liberal policies promoted by Washington. Neo-liberal policies are a set of market-based structural adjustment reforms mandated by international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. These policies are “intended” to bring about economic stabilization, reduce inflation, and promote growth.
[15] But as we examine the history of these financial institutions and their involvement in Latin America we see that these promises were never delivered.
Financial Institutions
The World Summit on Social development that took place in Copenhagen in 1995, declared; “we commit ourselves to ensuring that when structural adjustment programs are agreed to, they include social development goals, in particular eradicating poverty, promoting full and productive employment, and enhancing social integration.” Furthermore, in the summit was also promised that financial institutions that would promote structural adjustment policies would; first, promote basic social programs and expenditures, in particular those affecting the poor and vulnerable segments of society. Second, review the impact of structural adjustment programs on social development. Third, promote in the countries with economies in transition, an integrated approach to the transformation process. Fourth, design policies to promote more equitable and enhanced access to income and resources, and fifth, ensure that women do not bear a disproportionate burden of the transitional costs of such processes.
[16]
Even though a great number of promises were made during the World Summit in 1995, today it is evident that in Latin America, “SAPs imposed a logic that favors speculation instead of production, which impedes sustained growth and eventually lead to recession as a result of the interaction between several vicious cycles.”[17] These vicious cycles include; first, the main priority of the SAPs is to warrant payment of the service of the foreign debt which depends of capital flow from abroad and requires high interest rates. Second, the abrupt liberalization of trade and capital flow destroys local productive capacities and leads to unemployment, salary/wage reduction and depression of the domestic market, all of which deters productive investment particularly in the presence of high interest rates. Third, growth tends to cause a deficit in the balance of payment which could only be compensated for by an increase in capital flow or recessive measures. Since inflation control generally is established through a fixed exchange rate or a controlled slack devolution, sooner or later there begins speculation against the local currency, capital flight, devaluation and recession.[18]
Despite all the promises made during the World Summit, today, as before 1995, globalization in Latin America can be felt not by the economic growth, but by the presence of financial institutions, and, by the devastating “application of neoliberal structural adjustment programs that promote export-led development.”[19] “Export-led development is the theoretical policy thrust behind globalization, and globalization depends on the replacement of import-substitution by export-led development as favored development strategy of international lending institutions and national governments.”[20]
It is clear then, that the structural adjustment policies were accepted in the region because governments were advised that “the only manner to survive in globalization is to be competitive at any cost, and that the only road to economic growth are exports, [in the last 30 years], almost all countries of the region have adopted structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed from above by governments and from abroad by international financial agencies that have the purpose to promote and support a new pattern of accumulation based on the export of manufactured goods. Those policies are both caused by and condition for a specific form of globalization dominated by the interests of large multinational corporations and financial groups that express new international as well as national power relations.”[21]
Structural adjustment policies do not only involve economics, but they also require significant reform of the state itself. Social reform of the state is crucial to social policy, since it redefines the conception of how to satisfy social needs and involves all major welfare institutions.[22]
The reformation of the state in Latin America means that “the power of national governments and their ability to make national policies and pay for social services has been reduced without a corresponding increase in supra-national government or effective international cooperation.”[23] With many of the state reforms, “national governments have renounced the instruments that are necessary to direct the national economic process and to protect production and employment. Simultaneously, their international bargaining capacity has been weakened. Liberalization and dependency on foreign capital in order to equalize the balance of payments have made Latin American economies highly vulnerable to financial speculation and external shocks.”[24]
If there is something that is evident in Latin America after 30 years of neoliberal policies, it is the accumulation of the external debt and the lack of investment in social programs. Latin American countries despite their indebtedness are eligible for ever larger loans from international lending institutions. More international loans mean the repayment of ever larger debts by countries increasingly unable to pay them.[25]
Flow of capital that is not directed to social programs is a burden to most people in Latin America. The money has a high interest rate and must be repaid in time according to the rules established during the moment of the loan. But how can Latinos pay huge amounts of money when globalization has affected them in so many ways? “The answer is simple. – The borrower – the national government – increases taxes and cuts domestic spending, pushing the country’s impoverished populations into the black whole of poverty.”[26] Can you imagine a country cutting social spending when to begin with, it dedicates less than 10 percent of its GDP to the social budget?
The large flow of capital that goes to the region is conditioned, and local governments cannot invest the money in the areas that they feel that need immediate assistance. Both the IMF and the WB are good in making conditional loans. The IMF focuses on macroeconomic policies and the WB in microeconomic policies; in the case of tax policy their conditions for loans are quite complementary. For instance, the IMF – rather than the WB – calls explicitly for fiscal stabilization, but it is the WB that is more involved in the nuts and bolts of tax reforms in Latin American nations. As such, the IMF’s call for fiscal balance and the WB’s call for market-conforming tax reforms are quite complementary.”
[27]
Today, governments in Latin America have lost part of their power to decide about their own economic policies; but things get worse, at the present, “international lending institutions provide one set of solutions for a variety of complex needs and problems occurring in widely different countries as they seek the incorporation of all regional economies into a massive global system”[28] It is a shame that one set of solutions is being applied to so many different problems in Latin America, but as if that was not enough, today, the policies are not even the result of a careful analysis of the economic situation in at least one country of the region, but instead “the IMF programs are typically dictated from Washington, and shaped by the short mission during which its staff members pore over numbers in the finance ministries and central banks and make themselves comfortable if five-star hotels in the capitals”[29]
With one set of “solutions” to all problems the directives of the IMF seem to believe, “what the financial community views as good for the global economy is good for the global economy and should be done.”
[30] Based on the decisions of the IMF, it is evident that the institution pursues the interests of the financial community instead of the welfare of millions of Latin Americans.[31]
“Proponents of globalization are of one voice in their attack on the welfare state which is too expensive in world terms and has therefore outlived its usefulness.”[32] These people favored the structural adjustments policies promoted by Washington through the IMF, and the World Bank. These financial institutions have done a good job in portraying their policies as benign and desirable in developing countries. “We read everywhere today that international integration is proceeding rapidly as the result of increase flow of trade, capital, money, direct investment, technology, people, information and ideas across national borders.”[33] We hear that things are changing rapidly and that today everyone has the opportunity to get the potential benefits of globalization. But one hardly hears that “adjustment to free trade and globalization are costly and may not always be wholly desirable.”[34]
Globalization in a good part of the media is portrayed as something that has benefited millions of people all over the world – and indeed it has at least in some regions –. But today, there is a blind assumption that globalization is good for everyone. The assumption is that if globalization works for the Units States, for the European Union, or for China, then the developing countries can also get the potential benefits of it. However, the social, political, and economic problems in the developing countries not always facilitates the access to the benefits that globalization may bring. Furthermore, the size, the infrastructure, and the lack of technology of these countries, deny the possibility of getting the potential benefits of free trade and globalization in the same way that industrialize countries get.
The opening of Latin American markets to the international community is not a guaranty that things will improve. In most countries as it was stated before, the local economies just vanished away as a result of their inability to compete with huge multinational corporations. Furthermore, industrialized countries do not really seek to trade with the region. For instance, 80 percent of international trade and 75 percent of foreign direct investment takes place among Japan, the European Union, and the NAFTA area, with another 16.5 percent going into the new industrialized countries.
[35]
In other words, the Latin American economies are opening their markets not because they are able to sell their products abroad, but because they are hopeful that foreign direct investment would flow into the area, but as it was juts stated, the major exchange of trade happens in the countries of the north and the developing countries are useful as long as they can provide the raw materials and the natural resources to keep the economy of developed nations functioning.
Even though trade between the Latin American countries and the developed nations is not very significant, the neo-liberal policies promoted by the financial institutions and Washington emphasize in trade liberalization. “Trade liberalization is supposed to enhance a country’s income by forcing resources to move from less productive uses to more productive uses; as economists would say, utilizing comparative advantage. But moving resources from low-productivity uses to zero productivity does not enrich a country, and this is what happened all too often under the IMF programs.”
[36] Today, even the IMF agrees that it has pushed the agenda too far, and that the liberalization of capital and financial markets contributed to the global financial crises of the 1990s.[37]
The immediate effects of trade liberalization in Latin America have not been an increase in the number of jobs available. Instead, trade liberalization has easily destroyed jobs as inefficient industries close down under pressure from international competition. Certainly, the ideology of the IMF that more productive jots would be created as the old inefficient jobs that have been created behind protectionist walls are eliminated seems no to be true in Latin America.
[38]
Besides the insignificant trade – as compared to other regions – that happens between Latin America and the developed nations, there is another difference in the way investment is made in Latin America. “When compared with investors in advanced industrial economies, investors in Latin American nations have incentives to invest in liquid assets. Such assets are easily moved in conditions of political uncertainty, volatile macroeconomic performance, poor economic information, and other characteristics common to developing nations.”[39]
But investment in liquid assets is not the only problem in Latin America. Today, globalization allows the free movement of capital from one part of the globe to another in a matter of seconds, and investors aware of this possibility threaten government with an exit option. “Exit threats are accentuated by the fact that much investment in developing nations takes place in product markets, such as assembly and intermediate manufacturing, where pure cost considerations are crucial to competiveness. In such contexts, taxes on corporate income threaten thin profit margins and augment the exit threat of asset holders, therefore increasing pressure for governments to abandon progressive tax systems.”[40]
Once again, here one sees that globalization has undermine the power of the Latin American governments, and the insistence of neo-liberal policies of limited government makes things even easier for multinational corporation to do what they please in the region. If a government stands up and threatens to tax a multinational corporation it will reply back by threatening to leave the country and would claim that its contributions is already benefiting the country with the number of jobs that are created as a result of the operations of the corporation in such country.
Liberalization of trade is supposed to bring benefits to everyone. Powerful nations together with intergovernmental organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) for example, have been careful in portraying themselves as benign ones, to the extent that sometimes they have claimed that developing countries should be treated differently. Honoring this claim, developed countries are allowed, for instance, to deviate from the most favored nation principle by allowing lower tariffs on imports from developing countries –. However, even with this so called “preferential treatment,” developed countries’ tariffs against imports from developing countries are four times higher than tariffs against goods produced by other developed countries.
[41]
Liberalization of trade and the sudden opening of a small economy - as most of Latin American economies are – to the international arena without taking the necessary precautions and with a weak government unable to dictate its economic policies have devastated the Latin American economies. “When trade liberalization – the lowering of tariffs and elimination of protectionist measures – is done in the right way and at the right pace, so that new jobs are created as inefficient jobs are destroyed, there can be significant efficiency gains.”[42] However, the structural adjustments policies promoted by the IMF and the World Bank, together with other neo-liberal policies promoted by the WC do not allow an steady adjustment of the Latin American economies to the international arena, because an immediate opening of the market is emphasized with the claim that as soon as the economy is open, it can start to have the benefits of trade liberalization.
The effects of globalization can be seen all over Latin America. In the region today, “the process of globalization is seen as blurring national boundaries, shifting solidarities within and between nation-states, and deeply affecting the constitutions of national and inter-groups identities.”
[43]
The blurring of national boundaries is evident with the amount of economic flow that goes in and out of the countries. “Between 1980 and 1994, for instance, net capital flow to all developing nations increased by nearly 300 percent.”
[44] Today there is no doubt that such flows of money have had a great impact in domestic politics, and at the same time have made the economies of Latina American countries susceptible to the sudden shift of the flows of money that comes and leaves the region.
Some people still assume that globalization only involves trade, technology, and investment. A closer look of globalization reveals that it involves more than that, - like the free flow of labor for example. The flow of people in the industrialized countries has not only given them more but also better opportunities. But, “the outstanding aspect of globalization in Latin America is the confrontation of a new world economy with the liberalization of flow of financial and industrial capital, while the mobility of labor from south to north is increasingly controlled.”
[45] Yet, despite integration being a key element influenced by globalization, most analysis of the levels of economic integration pay attention to trade and investment but neglect to consider the free flow of labor in any form.[46]
As a result of the free movement of capital and the restricted movement of labor from the South to North about 80 percent of the world’s population lives in developing countries – a good number of that in Latin America – marked by low income and high poverty, high unemployment and low education. For those countries, globalization presents both unprecedented risks and - for the dominant elites - opportunities. Making globalization work in ways that enrich all requires making it work for people in developing nations.[47]
The free flow of capital and the restricted movement of labor have widened the gap between developed and developing nations. Restrictions on the movement of labor, the neoliberal policies promoted by Washington, and the structural adjustment policies of the financial institutions have created an economic model that “has had a negative impact on the distribution of income and wealth; on employment and wages; and on provisions of public benefits and services. Consequently, poverty has increased and social welfare has been eroded. The structural adjustment policies have led to concentration of income among rich households at the expense of the majority of households.
[48]
To have an idea of the household inequality in Latin America perhaps is good to remember that the richest 10 percent of households pocket twice the income of the poorest 40 percent of household in Argentina and Mexico, three times in Chile, four times in Brazil and 1.7 times in Venezuela. In all these countries, income distribution is substantially worse than a decade ago.[49] So the questions are, in what ways the majority of people in Latin America have seen the benefits of globalization? Where are the benefits that trade liberalization was supposed to bring to everyone? Would it be more appropriate to have a government that has more control in the economy and national policies? I certainly believe so.
There are six critical issues that are seen as a consequence of globalization in Latin America. First, growing polarization; second, limited democracy, - accepting neo-liberal policies means accepting economic decisions that are made by the market, the corporations and newly emerging global and regional institutions like the IMF, the WB, WTO, MERCOSUR, etc. Third, opportunistic migration and labor flow, - over the past two decades, the global restructuring of production has changed both the magnitude and geography of migration, particular in terms of labor flows from the economies of the South to the developed countries in the North. The demand for skilled workers in the developed nations is “brain draining” the economies of the South. Fourth, conflicting socio-cultural identities; socio-cultural identities have always been influenced to some degree by external forces, either directly through colonization and imperialism or indirectly by trade and other interactions. Fifth, adverse accessibility and mobility; millions of Latin Americans suffer today from inadequate accessibility and mobility, both in terms of their ability to access new opportunities and services and their physical mobility in rural and urban environments. And sixth, lower environmental quality; the ongoing and worsening degradation of the physical environment perhaps is the most serious immediate threat to development in the region.
[50]
There is no point in denying the potential benefits that globalization can bring to a society. But for these benefits to be a reality in Latin America an active role of the government is required. Both the government and the market must work together to enhance the benefits of globalization. If things continue to be as they are now, polarization and not integration will be the result of globalization in the area.
In closing, it can be stated that there are five main reasons why Latin Americans are skeptical of globalization. First, the rules of the game that govern globalization are unfair, specifically designed to advance the industrialized countries. Second, globalization advances material values over other values, such as concern for the environment of for life itself. Third, the way globalization has been managed has taken away much of the developing countries’ sovereignty, and their ability to make key decisions themselves in key areas that affect their citizens well being. Fourth, while the advocates of globalization have claimed that everyone will benefit economically, there is plenty of evidence from both developing and developed countries that there are many losers in both. And fifth, the economic system that has been pressed upon the developing countries – in some cases essentially forced upon them – is inappropriate and often grossly damaging. Globalization should not mean the Americanization of either economic policy or culture, but often it does, and that has caused resentment.
[51]
Almost 30 years of neoliberal policies have devastated the Latin American region. As a response to it, in the last seven years Latin America has witnessed the return of left-wing governments to power. These governments who have been democratically elected have promised to gradually stop their dependency in international financial institutions like the IMF and the WB, and they have declared themselves enemies of the “Washington Consensus” and the neoliberal policies.
Resentment toward the way globalization is working is not only voiced in Latin America, but also all over the rest of the developing nations around the world. Even leaders like the former “France’s president Jack Chirac, have expressed concern that globalization is not making life better for those most in need of its promised benefits.”
[52]
To get the potential benefits of globalization, Latin American “governments must have an active role in both promoting development and protecting the poor. Economic theory and historical experience provide guidance in what governments must do. While markets are at the center of any successful economy, [a] government has to create a climate that allows business to thrive and create jobs, it has to construct physical and institutional infrastructure, laws ensuring, for instance, a sound banking system and security markets in which investors can have confidence that they are not being cheated. Poorly developed markets are marked by monopolies; high prices in a vital area like telecommunications hinder development, so governments must have strong competition policies.”[53]
To improve the lives of millions of people in the developing world and therefore in Latin America, globalization must be reformed. Reforming globalization would require; first, make globalization fair for everyone, - trying this way to eliminate the pervasiveness of poverty. Second, globalization must also promote foreign assistance and debt relief. Third, globalization must make trade fair for everyone. Fourth, governments must have the capacity to limit liberalization. Fifth, globalization must not only seek economic profits but also promote the preservation of the environment. And sixth, leaders must fix the flawed system of global governance.[54]
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[1] Keeling, David J. “Latin America Development and the Globalization Imperative.” New Directions, Family Crisis 2004: Journal of Latin America Geography. p 3
2Orozco, Manuel. “Globalization and Migration.” The Impact of Family Remittances in Latin America. 1992: Latin America Politics and Society. Vol. 44, No. 2 p 42
3 Keeling, David J. “Latin America Development and the Globalization Imperative.” New Directions, Family Crisis 2004: Journal of Latin America Geography. p 3
4 Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 309




[5] Marden, Peter. The Decline of Politics. England: Ashagate Publishing Limited, 2003. p 4
[6] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. p 27
[7] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. p 36
[8] Harris, Jerry. “Bolivia and Venezuela.” The democratic dialectic in new revolutionary movements. http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/49/1/1. p 11
[9] Keeling, David J. “Latin America Development and the Globalization Imperative.” New Directions, Family Crisis 2004: Journal of Latin America Geography. p 12
[10] Streeten, Paul. Globalization; Threat or Opportunity? Herdon, VA: Copehagen Business School Press, 2001. P 27
[11] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 308
[12] Keeling, David J. “Latin America Development and the Globalization Imperative.” New Directions, Family Crisis 2004: Journal of Latin America Geography. p 4
[13] Pennar, Karen. “The World of theMultinationals.” The New York Times, 27 Feb. 1994. p BR 16
[14] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P18
[15] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P17
[16] Grumber, Isabelle. Globalization, the United Nations Development Dialogue. New York: United Nations University Press, 200. p 6
[17] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 309
[18] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 310
[19] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 306
[20] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P18
[21] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 307
[22] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 308
[23] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P115
[24] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 307

[25] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P17
[26] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P17
[27] Wibbels, Erick. “Taxation and Burden Shift in Latin America.” 2003: International Organization. Vol. 57, No 1 p 122
[28] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P17
[29] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 24
[30] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 195
[31] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 206
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