Friday, December 19, 2008

Immigration into the European Union

Immigration into the European Union
Since the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 to the present

There are a few approaches that provide us with insights to explain the patterns of migration flows. First, economic theory considers migration to be a reaction to labor markets and economic incentives. Second, cultural theories predict that migration flows will occur according to the central periphery pattern. And third, social net-work analysis assumes that immigrants follow already established migration networks.
[1]
This paper is designed to analyze the immigration policy of the EU in the last 12 years. To have a better understanding of how immigration policy gets created, in this paper I will review the policies and mandates of the Maastricht Treaty since it began in 1993. I will also analyze the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999, The Hague Program of 2004, and of course the European Commission’s 2005 Policy Plan for Legal Migration.
Due to the convincing evidence that in the European Union today the factors that drive immigration are not only political or economic, but rather a mixture of the two and perhaps other factors as well, this paper will not take a specific theoretical approach to explain the flow of immigrants to the Union.
Before getting into the policies of each of the above mentioned treaties, and before discussing the argument that Europe needs new immigrants, it is important to keep in mind that Western Europe has been integrating itself since the Treaty of Paris in 1951. So far integration has been considered an unprecedented success story. It has put in place more than 60 years of peace between countries whose common history, throughout centuries has been marked by iron and blood. If today Western Europe is compared to the rest of the globe, it can be seen that it has enjoyed “exceptional oasis” of continuing prosperity. Seen from the outside, the European Union (EU) is regarded as a strong political entity and a serious partner not only in trade but also in global negotiations, like sustainable development, climate change, and global governance.
[2]
Even though the EU has been successful in the integration of its economic areas; “on the issue of immigration, economic interests and political opinions often seem to be in conflict. Europe is an aging continent and public finances are straining with the ever-growing burden of public pensions. Also the fast growing service sector is generating the sort of jobs that most resident workers are reluctant to take.”[3]
To understand today’s policies, it is also important to know why the doors were close to immigrants in Western Europe. “Around 1974, most Western European countries abandoned migrant labor recruitment, and introduced restrictive entry rules.”[4] The restriction on immigration had to see with the decline of jobs once Europe has been reconstructed after WWII, and also with the growing economic crisis.
Today it is argued that the EU needs a massive influx of new immigrants. “Eurostat projections indicate that in the EU population growth until 2025 will be mainly due to net migration, since total deaths will outnumber total births from 2010. The effects of net migration will no longer outweigh the natural decrease after 2025. This will have serious repercussions on the number of employed people in the EU, as the share of population of working age in the total population is expected to decrease strongly, from 67.2% in 2004 to 56.7% in 2050, a fall of 52 million. The decline in the total population is expected by 2025, and in the working age population by 2011. Some member states like Germany, Hungary, Italy, and Latvia are already experiencing a decline in the working age population, while in others it will happen later.”
[5]
Eurostat projections show that the population of the EU as whole is likely to fall by 1.5% from 457 to 450 million by 2050. However, no all countries of the Union will be affected in the same degree. For example, in Germany the decline will be 9.6%, in Italy 8.9%, and in the Eastern and central European states the decline will be 11.7%. But the decline in the total population is not the only problem; more serious still is the decline of working age population, which is understood to be between 15 and 64 years of age. Today in the EU 67% of the population is of working age, compared with 16% of 65 years old or older. However, by 2050, a working age population of 57% will have to support 30% aged 65 or older.[6]
Today Eurostat is not the only agency that forecasts shortages of workers in the EU. There are other experts that also share the prediction of Eurostat and the concerns of so many political leaders in the Union. For example, David A. Coleman, from the Center for Migration Studies of New York, says that the EU must have an influx of new workers. According to Coleman; first, immigration is required in order to reinforce the population of working age, and perhaps more specifically to provide a service work force to care for the elderly and, in general demographic terms, to reduce the dependency ratio arising out of aging. Second, the work force is held to need immigrant labor, irrespective of the increase relative burden of the elderly, because domestic supplies of labor are simply insufficient to match labor demand. Third, throughout the European economy there are kinds of jobs that Europeans are reluctant to take, therefore, a migration force is needed to take these jobs. Fourth, economic growth is held to depend on growing population not only to provide work force but also to preserve the size of domestic markets, and the level aggregate demand and investment confidence in the future, as future customer growth will be guaranteed.[7]
In the EU demographics is not the only problem. Today, the world is interconnected and globalization allows the free flow of skill migrants at least in the developed nations. This free flow of skilled migrants have been affecting the EU since a good percentage of educated people move back and forth between the European Union, the United States, Canada and other industrialized countries. For such reasons, the EU not only needs migrants due to its demographic problems but also due to the growing percentage of skilled shortages. (Please see the chart at the end of this paper).
Besides demographics and the shortage of skilled workers, there are other factors that contribute to the support of new labor migration policies as well. For example; first, the informal economy, today, there is a strong evidence that the informal economy has grown in recent years, and it is indeed an unintended consequence of official measure to secure a “flexible labor market.” Second, globalization has been marked by growing inequality. Today high income countries have per capita GDPs that are 66 times those of low-income countries, and 14 times those of middle income countries. This inequality is a very powerful force driving migration. Third, the EU must cooperate with managing immigration from the South. The efforts of northern countries to recruit highly skilled personnel from the South have lead to the fears that the “brain drain” would lead to shortages of key personnel in healthcare, education, management, and administration and thus hamper economic development in those areas, contributing this way to the creation of a steady flow of illegal migration. Fourth, the growing number of refugees and asylum seekers; the level of democracy and human rights in less developed countries have increased the number of people seeking refuge and asylum. This sad reality triggers the need of an immigration policy that respects the mandates of the Geneva Convention, and at the same time is able to dress in a human way these and other problems.
[8]
It is also argued that an immigration policy that is able to regulate the high number of immigrant entering the Union is needed. Statistics show that “from 1980 to 1990, Europe received, each year, about 1.1 million immigrants while this number increased to an average of about 2 million between 1991 and 2004.”[9]
Leaders of the European Union, aware of the need of a good number of immigrants to replace the aging population and to maintain a vibrant economy, are seeking to come up with an immigration policy that is humane, and that not only benefit the receiving countries but also the countries where immigrants come from. Most importantly, the new leaders are seeking to come up with a policy that can avoid the problems of the past and that is able to greatly benefit the Union.
In order to avoid the same mistakes of the past and design a better policy, European politicians and also some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are urging; first, the strict enforcement of immigration and laws, especially against employers who illegally employ migrants or violate minimum wage and employment regulations. Second, the regulation of the cost at which migrants are made available to employers through, for example, the charging of monthly work permit fees for each migrant employed. Third, the implementation of effective labor market tests, mechanisms that create incentives for employers to recruit migrant workers only after reasonable effort have been made to recruit local workers. Fourth, the regulation or at least the monitoring of the migrant recruiting industry with an eye that aims to control migrants’ costs of migration. Fifth, the protection of migrants’ rights by making work permits portable within certain sectors or occupations after a certain period of time. And sixth, the creation of mixed incentive-enforcement measures to facilitate the return home of migrants whose temporary work permit has expired.
[10]
Immigration Policies; the Amsterdam Treaty of 1999
The Maastricht Treaty of 1993 created the European Union and also a single currency, the Euro. But during the first years of the Union, member states concentrated in political issues, in the creation of political structures, and of course in a better integration system. Therefore, immigration issues were not a priority during the first years of the 1990s. But things started to change with the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 which not only amended The Maastricht Treaty, but also emphasized democracy, gave more power to the European parliament, and promoted citizenship and rights of individuals.
What is relevant in the Amsterdam Treaty is that it addressed the most pressing concerns of ordinary Europeans, such as legal and personal security, and immigration and fraud prevention. With the Amsterdam Treaty, the European Union was now able to legislate on migration, civil law or civil procedure, insofar as it is necessary for the free movement of persons within the Union. The emphasis was that the Union must aim to establish an area of freedom, security, and justice for all its citizens.
[11]
Once the Treaty of Amsterdam gave the legitimate power to the EU to legislate on immigration issues, – although it had a good number of limitations that will be discussed later – “the EU rules now covered, inter alia, the right of third-country nationals to family reunification; the working rights of third-county nationals; the admission of third-country nationals as students or volunteers; financial and technical assistance to third country nationals facing migration and asylum crises; the temporary protection of persons display by economic, political, or environmental disasters, where member states are responsible for examining an asylum application; standards for the treatment of asylum seekers, and non-discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin.”[12] As it is evident, with the Treaty of Amsterdam the EU was now in charge from entry, residence, and economic rights of immigrants to societal integration of immigrants and their descendants.
With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Union has gained enormous competence in the delicate area of immigration and asylum policies, particularly regarding laws of visa and asylum and refugees issues. All policies were now binding and justifiable, and are superior to national legislation. National veto power on immigration and asylum within the European institutions was gradually reduced, and the European Parliament’s competence was gradually extended.
[13]
One thing to keep in mind is that despite the European Parliament having the veto power for the adoption of the above mentioned policies; member states had the absolute power to decide legal migration to their countries. Each country must decide according to its needs the number of people that could enter the country legally.
The Tampere European Council of 1999
Even though the Treaty of Amsterdam was very ambitious, during the first few months little was done about implementing the policies. But things started to change once The Tampere European Council of October 1999 took the lead. The Tampere European Council “was the first to address the development of the European Union as a unified region of freedom, security, and justice. It was considered to be the natural follow up of the Amsterdam Treaty, which emphasized cooperation between member states and integrated specific sectors into the community, like asylum, migration, border control etc. The Tampere European Council was the first EU forum to address the problem of improving the quality of European citizens’ everyday life in practical terms. It determined a number of political priorities, to which member states’ policies should conform by the end of year 2004.”
[14]
With regards to immigration issues all the treaties and policies in the EU have emphasized the need to create an area of freedom, security, and justice. In Tampere, the Council stated that it is determined to make full use of the possibilities offered by the Treaty of Amsterdam. “This requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration, and to combat those who organize it, and commit related international crimes.”[15] Furthermore, in Tampere, the European Council also emphasized that a “common approach must be developed to ensure the integration into our societies of those third country nationals who are lawfully resident in the Union.”[16]
The Tampere European Council calls for a common EU immigration policy and it is the first to deal in dept with immigration issues in the EU. Therefore, it is important to list some of its provisions;
First, the creation of a partnership with countries where immigrants come from; the European Union needs a comprehensive approach to immigration addressing political, human rights, and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states, and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women, and children.
Second, the creation of a common European asylum system; the European Council agrees to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based in the full and exclusive application of the Geneva Convention, thus ensuring that nobody is sent back to persecution.
Third, promote fair treatment of third country nationals; the EU must ensure fair treatment of third country nationals who reside legally in the territory of its member states. A more vigorous integration policy should aim at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens.
Fourth, adequate management of migration flow; the European Council stresses the need for more efficient management of immigration flows at all its stages. It calls for the development, - in close co-operation with countries of origin and transit, - of information campaigns on the actual possibilities for legal migration, and for the prevention of all forms of trafficking in human beings. Also, the European Council calls for closer co-operation and mutual technical assistance between the member states’ border control service, and for assistance to countries of origin and transit to be developed in order to promote voluntary return as well as to help the authorities of those countries to strengthen their ability to combat effectively trafficking in human beings.
[17] These and other measures were to be taken within a five year period. (Obviously, the Tampere European Council has other provisions as well but they are not related to immigration.)
As it was mentioned before, ever since the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European Union has been promoting an area of freedom, security, and peace. In 2004, the European Parliament gathered in Brussels also embraced the notion of promoting a genuine common policy of management of migration flows. Parliament leaders said; there must be a realistic approach taking account of economic and demographic needs, to facilitate the legal admission of immigrants to the Union, in accordance with a coherent policy respecting the principle of fair treatment of third-country nationals. These leaders also argued about the right of member states to set the actual number of third-country nationals admitted to work in an employed or self-employed capacity within an overall framework including community reference. Finally, the Parliament leaders also favored that the interest of the countries where immigrants come from should be taken into account.
[18]
The EU immigration plan is certainly ambitious, but in order to understand the magnitude of this plan, it is important to review part of the ideals of the Union itself. Even before the 1990s, the free movement of persons within the community has been an integral part of the creation of a Common European Market. “The European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty specifies [the right of free movement], by stating that freedom for workers shall be secured within the Community and shall ‘entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the member states as regards employment, remuneration, and other conditions of work and employment.’ Furthermore, EEC nationals who have been employed in a member state and their family members, have the right to remain there when they have reached pensionable age or suffer from permanent incapacity.”[19]
In other words, the EEC Treaty Article 48 [2] defined the “right to free movement as a right of a national of one member state to move freely to another member state to accept offers of employment and stay there. Therefore, the Treaty of Amsterdam and all the treaties that came afterwards complemented the things that were previously established in the EEC Treaty. They also extended rights to third-country nationals who legally reside in the Union, and also gave rights to family members of the EU nationals who do not need to have the nationality of one of the member states.
As previously mentioned, the EEC Treaty and the Amsterdam Treaty were designed at least in part to accept the free movement of labor or “economic workers” as they call. However, things did not start to move until late 1999, more specifically until the Tampere European Council took place. After 2000, one can find a number of things that the European Parliament and the other EU organizations promoted to accomplish the immigration goals that were established in 1999.
From 1999 to 2004 evidence shows that the European Parliament took the issue of immigration at least in six different times;
“The first bill, on the equal treatment between persons without racial and ethnic discrimination, aimed to establish an EU-wide definition of discrimination on the grounds of racial and ethnic origin, to shift the burden of proof to the defendant in certain circumstances, and to provide a minimum level of redress for people who suffered discrimination. The second bill, on family reunification of third-country nationals, proposed that third-country nationals residing lawfully in the EU, refugees and other persons enjoying subsidiary protection, and EU citizens whose family are third-country nationals, should have full rights to family reunification. The third bill, aimed to establish a general framework to combat discrimination and ensure equal treatment in employment, and covered nondiscrimination on the grounds of religion or belief as well as disability, age, or sexual orientation. The fourth time that the issue of immigration was taken had to see with the status of third-country nationals who are long term residents of the Union. The bill aimed to facilitate the freedom of movement for resident-third country nationals, to better regulate the status of family members of citizens of the EU, and to define the possibilities for refusing or withdrawing the right of residents. The fifth time that the European Parliament discussed the issue of immigration was with the aim to harmonize EU rules on the entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of paid employment and self-employment. This time the Parliament set out common definitions, criteria, and procedures regarding the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purpose of employment and a single national application procedure encompassing both residence and work permit within one administrative act. Finally, the last time the issue of immigration was discussed before the end of the five year period the European Parliament aimed to amend the second bill which has to see with third-country nationals’ rights to family reunification. There were two main changes to the original bill; first, a standstill clause, which would restrict national discretion in the application of the terms of the legislation, and second, a deadline clause, which set a deadline of two years after the transposition of the legislation for the initiation of a more fully harmonized law an family reunification.
[20]
As it is evident, the European Parliament has tried hard to regulate the flow of immigration in a five year period. However, not all legislations passed in the European Council and things became a little more complicated when in 2004, 10 new member states came to form part the European Union. For example, member states that joined the Union on May 1st, 2004 and on January 1st, 2007 and whose nationals faced restrictions of entry (meaning visa requirements) in one of the EU member states that formed part of the EU before accession may imposed equivalent restrictions on workers from these member states.[21]
The ten new member states in 2004, and the other two states in 2007, that became part of the EU were aware that up to seven years after accession certain conditions may apply that restrict the free movement of their people for the purpose of taking a job and the restriction may differ from one member state to another. However, it was also established that member states that joined the union in 2004 and 2007 and who are subject to transitional arrangements must be given priority over workers from third countries.[22]
Before moving on to analyze the goals of The Hague Program of 2004, and the policies about the issue of immigration that were taken in the European Parliament since 1999, it is time to clarify that even though the European Parliament gained policy decision on the issue of immigration with the Amsterdam Treaty, states still retain the right to legislate on issues of legal migration. And it is to that issue that we turn now.
“National competence is, above all, retained in the area of legal migration, especially with regard to the attraction of specific groups or migrants.”
[23] European States perhaps would have loose power to legislate in this area of immigration too if it was not for Germany who strongly argued in maintaining domestic competence in legal migration issues. Germany took this position because the country is trying to protect its national labor market. Germany also succeeded with its position in the European Convention by embodying domestic instead of European responsibility in the draft of the EU constitution for those aspects that regulate the number of third-country nationals coming to the EU for economic purposes.[24]
The issue of legal migration has not ended once the countries managed to retain jurisdiction on this matter, because it is assumed that since the EU is closely connected among its members, a large number of legal migrants seeking work in one member state would inevitably affect other states in their labor market.[25]
The Hague Program 2004
In part, The Hague Program came to be as a response to the Terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, and the terrorists attacks in Madrid on March 11th 2004, but also because five years after the European Council Meeting in Tampere it was time for a new agenda on immigration that would help the Union to be able to face effectively the new challenges and new threats.
[26]
According to the European Council, the previous five years have been a good step towards integrating the Union. “The foundations for a common asylum and immigration policy have been laid, the harmonization of border controls has been prepared, policy cooperation has been improved, and the groundwork for judicial cooperation on the basis of the principle of mutual recognition of judicial decisions and judgments has been well advanced.”[27]
Aware of the previous achievements, the main aim of The Hague Program is “to improve the common capabilities of the Union and its Member States to guaranty the fundamental rights, minimum procedural safeguards and access to justice, to provide protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention on Refugees and other international treaties to persons in need, to regulate migration flows and to control the external borders of the Union, to fight organized cross-border crime and repress the threat of terrorism, to realize the potential of Europol and Eurojust, to carry further the mutual recognition of judicial decisions and certificates both in civil and in criminal matters, and to eliminate legal and judicial obstacles in litigation in civil and family matters with cross-border implications.”[28]
Just like in the previous program, the Hague Program is extensive and covers not only issues of immigration and the free flow of “economic workers” but also aims at dealing with other issues like peace, integration, and security.
To achieve the established goals from 2004 to 2009, The Hague Program would divide its work in different areas and subsections. First; it will concentrate in the Citizenship of the Union, - the right of all EU citizens to move and reside freely in the territory of member states is the central right of citizenship of the Union -. EU citizens would be able to move within the Union on similar terms to nationals of a member state moving around or changing their place or residence in their own country, in conformity with established principles of Community law. Second, it will deal with asylum, migration, and border policy. A comprehensive approach, involving all stages of migration with respect to the root causes of migration, entry and admission policies, and integration and return policies is needed in the Union. With regards to people seeking asylum and the issue of border control the European Parliament and the Council urged its members to collaborate with one another based on solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities including its financial implications and closer practical cooperation between member states in the areas of technical assistance, training, and exchange of information, monitoring of the adequate and timely implementation and application of policies, as well as further harmonization of legislation. Third, the advancement of a common European Asylum System; the aim is to establish a common asylum procedure and an uniform status for those who are granted asylum or subsidiary protection. This system would be based in the full and exclusive application of the Geneva Convention on refugees and other relevant treaties, and should be built on a thorough and complete evaluation of the legal instruments that have been adopted in the first place. Fourth, promote legal migration, and fight against illegal employment; the European Council emphasizes that the termination of volumes of admission of labour migrants is a competence of the member states. However, it also emphasizes that employers who violate the law and who do not abide by the rules would be heavily sanctioned. Fifth, promote the integration of third-country nationals; stability and cohesion within our societies benefit from the successful integration of legally resident third-country nationals and their descendants. To achieve this objective, it is essential to develop effective policies, and prevent the isolation of certain groups. Sixth, create a partnership with third countries; the EU policy should aim at assisting third countries, in full partnership, using existing community funds where appropriate, in their efforts to improve their capacity for migration management and refugee protection, prevent and combat illegal immigration, inform about legal channels for migration, resolve refugee situations by providing better access to durable solutions, build border-control capacity, enhance document security, and tackle the problem of return. Seventh, strict enforcement of the return and re-admission policy; migrants who do not longer have the right to stay legally in the EU must return on a voluntary or, if necessary, compulsory basis. The European Council calls for the establishment of an effective removal and repatriation policy based on common standards for persons to be returned in a humane manner and with full respect for their human rights and dignity. Eighth, improve border checks and fight against illegal migration; the European Council stresses the importance of swift abolition of internal border control, and the strengthening of controls at and surveillance of the external borders of the Union. In this respect, the need for solidarity and sharing of responsibility including its financial implications between the member states is underlined.
[29]
In a few words it can be said that The Hague Program concentrated in combating terrorism, the security aspect of the Union, the exchange of law enforcement information, special border assistance provided by the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Border (established in 2005), the possibility of creating a border guard, and the study of an eventual join processing of asylum applications outside the EU.[30]
Commission on the European Communities
Policy Plan on Legal Migration 2005
The president of the commission on legal migration Jose Manuel Borroso in 2005, emphasized the necessity of creating an economic migration system. Furthermore, the members of the commission aware of the need of economic workers designed a plan addressing four main concerns. First, high-skilled workers, for whom common special procedures and admission would be offered; second, seasonal workers for agriculture, building and catering, who would be allow to come in certain number of months. Third, intra-corporate transfers, people moving within international companies would be granted temporary residence, and fourth, remunerated trainees, who can also be granted temporary residence.
[31]
This Policy Plan on Legal Migration, unlike its predecessor specifically aims at attracting high-skilled workers. This policy has created some controversies; on the one hand critics of the policy claim that it leads to “brain drain” key workers from developing nations.[32] But, on the other hand people who support this type of policy emphasize that it “contains proposals to improve information resources for migrants and to improve the economic and social integration or immigrants already in the EU, the policy also stresses the development of win-win opportunities for both the migrant and the countries concerned.”[33]
On 2007, the Commission on the European Communities presented to the European Parliament and Council another project called the Green Paper. This new project deals with the future Common European Asylum System, and it is concerned with the following issues; processing of asylum applications, reception conditions for asylum seekers, and granting of protection and integration.[34]
Unlike other industrialized countries like the US for example, it is evident that the EU is working hard to solve the issue of immigration despite the conflicting interests that exist among its 27 members. The EU not only wants to solve the issue of immigration, it also wants third-country nationals to integrate into the new system and into society, and with this aim in mind, the Union has began to create a comprehensive policy which includes integration into the labour market, education and language skills, and citizenship and respect for diversity (the European Parliament and Council just emphasizes these policies, these measure are to be taken by individual states.)
To better integrate new immigrants into the European system, the EU is also promoting training of immigrants in the countries of origin. “Professional training and linguistic courses in the country of origin could help immigrants to develop skills and better adjust to the labour needs in the EU, thus facilitating their opportunities to find legal employment.”
[35]
Overall, it can be said that the EU’s plan on immigration is comprehensive despite political disagreements and economic interests of its 27 members. So far, the discussion and established policies about immigration and asylum issues have been creating precedents for future policies. In the areas that immigration policies have not been advanced it is clear that despite the need of immigrants, politics rather than economics, determines individuals’ and countries’ attitudes towards migration.[36] “Left-wing politicians support liberal migration policies, despite the economic interest of many of their voters, who often compete with immigrants for unskilled jobs. Meanwhile, right-wing politicians support restrictive migration policies, despite the economic interests of many of their supporters, who benefit from increasing returns on capital investment which results from greater immigration.”[37]
Just like in the United States, in the European Union people who strongly oppose new immigrants are the unskilled and unemployed workers, for these groups of people, new immigrants represent a serious challenge.[38]
As it was stated before one of the goals of The Hague Program was the return and repatriation of immigrants who have overstayed their visas or who are in the Union illegally. In an attempt to solve this problem, representatives of the 27 members of the Union passed a bill called “The Directive Return” on June 5, 2008. If this policy is implemented, then it means that people who are illegally in the Union could be detained by a period of up to 18 months before they can be repatriated. These people could be incarcerated without the necessity of a judicial order but only with an administrative order. Furthermore, people under the age of 18 who do not have family in the Union, and even if they do, they could also be deported. Deported people would not be eligible to return to the Union for a period of five years.
In response to this hard policy, and aware that the their compatriots would be greatly affected, the Latin American leaders who gathered in Argentina on 1 July 2008, for the MERCOSUR summit unanimously criticized the decision of the European Union, and asked that the policy be forgotten and not enforced in 2010 as the EU plans to do.[39]

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www.elcomercio.com.pe/ediciononline/htmll; “Sudamerica rechaza la politica migratoria de la Union Europea.” July 1, 2008.
[1] Hooghe, Mark. “Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980 – 2004.” 2008: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 42, No. 2 p 476
[2] Pernice, Ingolf. “Saving the Constitution for Europe; A Reform Treaty for the EU.” Sep. 2007: Walter Hallstein-Institut. p 1
[3] Hix, Simon. “Politics, Not Economic Interests; Determinants of Migration Policies in the European Union.” 2007: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 41, No. 1 p 182
[4] Castles, Stephen. “Guest-workers in Europe: A Resurrection?” 2006: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 40, No. 4 p 741
[5] Commission of the European Communities. “Policy Plan on Legal Migration.” Brussels, Dec. 21. 2005: p 4
[6] Castles, Stephen. “Guest-workers in Europe: A Resurrection?” 2006: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 40, No. 4 p 745
[7] Coleman, David. “Does Europe Need Immigrants? Population and Work Force Projections.” 1992: International Migration Review. Vol. 26, No. 2 p 414
[8] Castles, Stephen. “Guest-workers in Europe: A Resurrection?” 2006: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 40, No. 4 p 741
[9] Hooghe, Mark. “Migration to European Countries: A Structural Explanation of Patterns, 1980 – 2004.” 2008: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 42, No. 2 p 483
[10] Castles, Stephen. “Guest-workers in Europe: A Resurrection?” 2006: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 40, No. 4 p 747 - 748
[11] European Union. “Treaty of Amsterdam.” May 1, 1999
[12] Hix, Simon. “Politics, Not Economic Interests; Determinants of Migration Policies in the European Union.” 2007: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 41, No. 1 p 183
[13] Bendel, Petra. “Immigration Policy in the European Union: Still bringing up the walls for fortress Europe?” 2005: Migration Letters. Vol. 2, No. 1 p 22
[14] Embassy of Greece, Washington, DC. “Implementation and Evaluation of the Tampere Conclusions.” Http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/ArticlePrint.aspx.
[15] Tampere European Council. 15 and 16 October 1999 p 1
[16] Tampere European Council. 15 and 16 October 1999 p 2
[17] Tampere European Council. 15 and 16 October 1999 p 2 - 6
[18] Communication From the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament. “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere program and future orientation.” 2004: Brussels p 9
[19] Niessen, Jan. “European Community Legislation and Intergovernmental Cooperation on Migration.” 1992: International Migration Review. Vol. 26, No. 2 p 677
[20]Hix, Simon. “Politics, Not Economic Interests; Determinants of Migration Policies in the European Union.” 2007: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 41, No. 1 p 189 - 190
[21] http://www.Ec.erupa.eu/employment_social/free_movement/enlargement_en.htm.-24k
[22] http://www.Ec.erupa.eu/employment_social/free_movement/enlargement_en.htm.-24k
[23] Bendel, Petra. “Immigration Policy in the European Union: Still bringing up the walls for fortress Europe?” 2005: Migration Letters. Vol. 2, No. 1 p 27
[24] Bendel, Petra. “Immigration Policy in the European Union: Still bringing up the walls for fortress Europe?” 2005: Migration Letters. Vol. 2, No. 1 p 23
[25] Commission of the European Communities. “Policy Plan on Legal Migration.” Brussels, Dec. 21. 2005: p 4
[26] Council of the European Union. “The Hague Program; strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union.” Dec. 13, 2004: The Hague. p 3
[27] Council of the European Union. “The Hague Program; strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union.” Dec. 13, 2004: The Hague. p 2
[28] Council of the European Union. “The Hague Program; strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union.” Dec. 13, 2004: The Hague. p 3
[29] Council of the European Union. “The Hague Program; strengthening freedom, security and justice in the European Union.” Dec. 13, 2004: The Hague. p 7 - 14
[30] Bendel, Petra. “Immigration Policy in the European Union: Still bringing up the walls for fortress Europe?” 2005: Migration Letters. Vol. 2, No. 1 p 24
[31] Castles, Stephen. “Guest-workers in Europe: A Resurrection?” 2006: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 40, No. 4 p 757
[32] Castles, Stephen. “Guest-workers in Europe: A Resurrection?” 2006: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 40, No. 4 p 757
[33] Castles, Stephen. “Guest-workers in Europe: A Resurrection?” 2006: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 40, No. 4 p 758
[34] Commission of the European Communities. “Green Paper, on the future Common European Asylum System.” Jun. 6, 2007 p 3 - 8
[35] Commission of the European Communities. “Policy Plan on Legal Migration.” Dec. 21. 2005: Brussels, p 11
[36] Hix, Simon. “Politics, Not Economic Interests; Determinants of Migration Policies in the European Union.” 2007: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 41, No. 1 p 185
[37] Hix, Simon. “Politics, Not Economic Interests; Determinants of Migration Policies in the European Union.” 2007: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 41, No. 1 p 184
[38] Hix, Simon. “Politics, Not Economic Interests; Determinants of Migration Policies in the European Union.” 2007: Center for Migration Studies of New York. Vol. 41, No. 1 p 184
[39] www.elcomercio.com.pe/ediciononline/htmll; “Sudamerica rechaza la politica migratoria de la Union Europea.” July 1, 2008.

NAFTA: Regional Trade Agreement

NAFTA; Regional Trade Agreement
The North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations in the early 1990s created lots of controversy between two opposite groups; those who favored the agreement and those who opposed it. Almost 15 years later NAFTA has produced mixed results and therefore the contradictions have not vanished away.
The international law created under NAFTA is a complex set of rules and norms that binds three countries together; Mexico, the United States, and Canada. The aim of this agreement is to; first, eliminate barriers to trade and facilitate the cross-border movement of goods and services among the parties. Second, promote conditions of fair competition. Third, increase investment opportunities. Fourth, provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights. Fifth, create effective procedures for the implementation and application of the agreements, and sixth, establish a framework for trilateral, regional, and multilateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of the agreement.
[1]
The controversy of this agreement began because “bringing Mexico into the fold, the United States and Canada became the first countries with well developed civil societies to extend free trade status to a developing country that had not yet created the cultural infrastructure needed for a well-developed civil society.”
[2] On the one hand, opponents of the agreement like Mr. Kenny Lortz, an employee of Cummins Diesel, during a hearing in the One Hundred Second Congress Session said; “even if we were willing to compete, we would not be able to unless we are willing to lower our standards of living.”[3]Opponent of the agreement also included “environmental activists who were concern that Mexico’s lax environmental protection status would harm the rivers, air, and health of the people living in the Rio Grande Valley.”[4]
On the other hand, the business community favored the agreement. According to a survey taken in the U.S. 72 percent of the business executives supported NAFTA. In fact, business supporters not only favored the treaty, but they also formed an umbrella organization called Coalition for Trade Expansion which included more than 500 corporations and lobbyists.
[5]
A close look at the NAFTA Charter reveals that this agreement was designed to increment and improve trade among the three parties, but it did not addressed very well other concerns like labor and environmental issues. To ensure that the objectives of the agreement would be reached the parties established a Free Trade Commission which would be composed by cabinet-level representatives of the parties. The Commission’s job is to supervise the implementation of the agreement, oversee its further elaboration, resolve disputes, and supervise the work of all committees and working groups established under this agreement. Furthermore, the commission may also establish and delegate responsibilities to ad hoc or standing committees, seek the advice of non-governmental persons, and take action in the exercise of its functions as the Parties may agree.[6]
Besides the Commission, a Secretariat was also established and its’ main job is to provide assistance to the commission, and provide administrative assistance to panel and committees established under NAFTA’S chapter 19.
[7] Because these institutions were created as part of the agreement, it can be argued that international law created under NAFTA took a normative system; it certainly provides directions for international relations by identifying its goals and it takes a legislative character by mandating particular values and directing specific changes in states behavior.[8] It can be also argued that international law created under NAFTA resembles hard law. It’s charter refers to legally binding obligations that are precise and reciprocal. Furthermore, it delegates authority to the ad hoc tribunals and to the two institutions created under the supplemental agreement to interpret and implement the law.[9]
Ad hoc tribunals created under NAFTA to monitor compliance and resolve disputes make this international law of the category of Second order compliance. NAFTA’s chapter XI empowers investors to bring claims against host governments.
[10] Furthermore, chapter XI details four procedures allowing private actors to bring claims against the Parties;
First, each Party shall accord to investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. Second, each Party shall accord to investments of investors of another Party treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like circumstances, to investments of its own investors with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments. Third, no Party may impose on an investor of another Party a requirement that a minimum level of equity in an enterprise in the territory of the Party be held by its nationals, other than nominal qualifying shares for directors or incorporators of corporations, and fourth, n o party may require an investor of another Party, by reason of its nationality, to sell or otherwise dispose of an investment in the territory of the Party.
[11]
Besides chapter XI, NAFTA’s chapter XIX also “allows corporations and governments to challenge parties’ antidumping and countervailing-duty determination; and the supplemental agreement allows persons and nongovernmental organizations to claim that the parties are failing to effectively enforce their domestic environmental and labor laws.
[12]
The supplemental agreements discussed under NAFTA created two more institutions; first, the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC), its job is to establish procedures by which interested persons my request the preparation of a “factual record” by the Secretariat. The factual record will report on whether a NAFTA Party is effectively enforcing its environmental law. Second, the North American Commission for Labor
Cooperation (NACLC), it obligates each party to establish a National Administrative Office to hear complaints concerning labor law enforcement in the Parties.
[13]
Knowing that Mexico has a law similar to the US law with regards to environmental standards, but also aware that compliance in Mexico is far lower, the United States proposed the creation of NACEC.[14] This move by the United States responded to the concerns of some environmentalists who opposed a free trade zone because they feared that the free trade agreement would accelerate investment and production along the border and in Mexico City, exacerbating an already serious problem. Concerned environmentalists argued that firms would move south to avoid tougher laws and enforcement in the U.S. and Canada,[15]and according to them, Mexico’s lack of enforcement of environmental law would accelerate job flight from US companies.[16]Therefore, NACEC was created with the purpose of addressing; first, the pesticide residues on Mexican products exported to the U.S., second, pesticide poisonings of Mexican farm workers, and third, damage to the physical environment.[17]
The U.S. also proposed the labor side agreement in order to calm down the fear of some people who argued that U.S. companies would relocate to Mexico in order to take advantage of lower labor costs that give a comparative advantage to this country.[18] “Like the environmental agreement, the labor agreement creates a procedure through which a party may claim that another party has engaged in a persistent pattern of ineffective enforcement, and provides for another procedure through which nongovernmental actors may raise claims of ineffective enforcement.”[19]
NAFTA’S law which is designed to bind the three Parties together follows acceptable standards of international law. However, as it was stated before, this legal agreement offers more benefits to the business community than to the labor community. If one assumes that in these two communities there are different interests, then, it is understandable that almost 15 years after the agreement there still is support and opposition to NAFTA treaty.
Even though opposition still persists, according to Jaime Sierra Puche – Mexico’s Commerce Secretary who negotiated the agreement – NAFTA has been a huge success because its two objectives; to help increase Mexico’s export capacity, and the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment has been achieved.
[20]
From the business community perspective it certainly seems that NAFTA has achieved its objective. For example, in 1994, more than 200 U.S. firms move their operations to Mexico, and during the first six months of implementation of the treaty, Mexican exports had increased 20 percent and U.S. exports to Mexico has jumped by 17 percent.[21] In April 2000, in a hearing before Congress, Kenneth Mackay, special envoy for the Americas argued that, “NAFTA has helped the U.S. economy remain strong.[22] Bryan Samuel, acting Assistance Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, from the Department of State also defended the treaty, and said, “the economic benefits of NAFTA are clear. It has generated growth and economic momentum for many regions, communities and individual citizens. NAFTA has helped spur the creation of a North American market characterized by low and declining trade barriers, common standards, enhanced cooperation on labor and environment issues and economic innovation and dynamism. Trade among the three NAFTA countries has grown by 96 percent since NAFTA entered into force in 1994. In dollar figures, our trilateral trade increased from $289 billion in 1993 to about $570 billion in 1999.”[23]Ted McNamara, President and CEO of the Council of the Americas, also saw as positive the impact of NAFTA, according to him, “since 1993, trade among the U.S., Canada, and Mexico is up more that 85%.”[24]Other economist and experts also consider the impact of NAFTA as positive, for example an expert in economics argued that largely thanks to the trade agreement, the Mexican economy managed to grow between 5 and 6% from 1994 to 1997.[25]
The economic impact of NAFTA at least in some areas of the three economies does seem to have a positive outcome. For example, Mexico has emerged as an export base for cars, trucks, and automobile parts more swiftly and dramatically than anyone could have imagined. “In 1995, domestic sales were only 185,000 vehicles and exports increased to 781,000, but in 1996, sales in Mexico rose to 334,000 units, while exports soared to 975,000.”[26]
There is no point in denying the economic benefits of NAFTA. However, not all people are seeing the benefits of this trade agreement. In fact, a good number of people have been deeply affected by it, and for them life has become simply more difficult.
Therefore, from the point of view of the campesinos and labor workers in general, NAFTA has not been a success. Since the beginning of the debate the Democrat Senator Metzenbaun from Ohio argued “that this agreement does not address labor or worker rights, the environment, and health and safety standards adequately.”
[27]The senator also cautioned that “the agreement will cost hundreds of thousands of jobs and threaten the standards of living for millions of Americans.”[28]
Perhaps the biggest problem for agriculture workers in Mexico is the issue of completion. With NAFTA, campesinos in Mexico were suddenly confronted with the prospect of competing with large U.S. and Canadian agribusiness corporations.[29]From the campesinos’ point of view, the agreement did not addressed the concern of them despite the fact that in Mexico corn is produced by approximately 2.4 million poor family farmers.
Before NAFTA, corn and beans were protected through import restrictions and a guaranteed farm price offered by Bonasupo, but now with the agreement the government must stop protecting national agriculture products and the market will determine the price.
[30]
Aware that the effects of NAFTA have devastated the small agriculture producers, it is fair to say that “the trade treaty has increased Mexico’s exports and expanded its middle class [and] has left small farmers without a share of the prosperity. Today, the farmers are just as poor as they were before NAFTA, [and] the government has done little since then to help them move beyond subsistence farming.”[31]
But farmers and labor workers as well as unionist who opposed NAFTA did not only suffer the negative effects of the treaty, but they were also persecuted for their opposition to it. If fact “the Reclusorio del Oriente, the federal prison in the eastern district of Mexico City, is [considered] the free trade prison. In 1995 and 1996, as the government of President Ernesto Zedillo overhauled the Mexican economy, the Reclusorio del Orient became the destination for workers and unionists who stood in the way of economic reform.”[32]Fortunately, the government did not abandoned the prisoners completely, and in fact, it continued to negotiate with the union’s leaders over the elimination of their jobs, but those talks took place inside the prison’s offices, with the warden acting as a go-between, therefore, some leaders went further and argued that they are being forced to negotiate with a gun in their heads.[33]
The assumption of agriculture workers and small business that NAFTA will not benefit them was well founded, and they were certainly correct to claim that the treaty was designed to have profound damaging consequences. For example, in 1995, “the confederation of Mexican Workers announced that two businesses a day had been closing in Mexico…and the nation’s giant oil monopoly Pemex, announced that 3,000 of its employees would be laid off.”[34]
Layoffs were not a surprise for workers, they knew that the loss of Mexican jobs will occur in spite of increase in manufacturing employment.”[35]But even if jobs remain as they were, campesinos knew that the trade agreement would still not benefit them because they don’t have agricultural machinery to compete with big US and Canadian corporations. Furthermore, they knew that the condition of the roads in Mexico makes marketing a perishable commodity nearly impossible, and that finding a buyer for the small quantity of their products that their small property can produce was going to be a Herculean task.[36]
But as agriculture producers were losing jobs and were unable to compete, other sectors of the Mexican economy were getting the “benefits” of NAFTA. Maquiladoras in Mexico, especially those close to the border saw an increase in the number of its employees. “At the end of 2000, there were more than 3,700 firms; employing more than 1.3 million workers [and by this time] the maquiladoras became the main source of creation of industrial jobs.”[37]
“The maquiladora activities that grew most rapidly were the manufacture of auto parts.”[38] This meant that even with the amount of jobs created by the growing number of maquiladoras, job opportunities was greater for people with a descent level of education and not for the campesinos whose level of education is low.
According to the evidence, it can be said that NAFTA at least in a part accomplished its goals – increased trade, attracted foreign direct investment, eliminated tariffs etc. However, it can also be argued - as union leaders, workers, campesinos and small business owners argued – that NAFTA did not addressed the concerns of labor workers in the U.S. and the campesinos in Mexico, despite the fact that political leaders promised that “everyone will benefit from the agreement.” Today, it can be argued that one of the reasons why NAFTA “remains controversial is that advocates and opponents were guilty of exaggerating its potential impact. Advocates claimed that it would create hundreds of thousands of job from the dramatic rise in exports, and opponents claimed it would destroy far more jobs from a flood of imports entering the United States and a stampede of U.S. companies moving to Mexico to take advantage of cheap labor.”
[39]
An interesting fact that can be learned from international law that NAFTA created is that with regards to foreign direct investment and despite dire predictions the treaty “did not caused an exodus of manufacturing investment to Mexico. Yes, U.S. investment in Mexico did increase after NAFTA, along with trade but it remains a trickle compared with annual investment in the domestic U.S. economy. Lower wages are not the only reason why U.S. companies invest abroad. Foreign direct investment seeks wealthy consumers, modern infrastructure, open trade, the rule of law, protected property rights, and an educated and productive workforce. For all these reasons, U.S. companies invest far more in other advanced, high-wage, high-standard economies than they do in less-developed countries such as Mexico.”[40]
When the treaty was being negotiated and when this international law was being created, the three Party leaders sought support for this agreement claiming that the benefits will not only be for big corporations but also for workers and small business. In fact, President Salinas from Mexico “told his countrymen that free trade would deliver them from the Third World to the developed economies.”[41]Furthermore, President Salinas told his people, “I don’t want Mexicans living the country anymore, only our products.”[42]Sadly enough, a few years later, a massive number of Mexicans were crossing the border illegally. This sudden migration increase triggered a reaction in the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) office and as a consequence in 1997, the INS spent $800 million on the southwest border enforcement, up from $400 million in 1993; also the Border Patrol along the southwest border grew by 83% from 3,389 to 6,213 agents.[43]
Considering the overall effects of NAFTA it does not seem to be consistent with President Salinas’ claim that this treaty will take Mexico to the rank of developed nations. “Since the implementation of NAFTA, Mexico’s annual GDP growth has averaged a mere 2.5% and only 1.1% in per-person terms.”[44]Can anyone argue that at this pace Mexico is truly in its path to be a developed nation?
In the U.S. also similar promises were made regarding job creation. “The White House claimed that free trade would createbetween 44,000 to 150,000 new American jobs.”
[45] U.S. supportive economists also “predicted that 170,000 jobs would be created during the first year [of NAFTA].”[46] However, today it is well known that the amount of jobs that were supposed to be created with this trade agreement is far lower than it was initially claimed.
The low amount of job creation and the higher number of Mexican immigrants leaving the country is not consistent with what the supporters and proponents of NAFTA argued during the initial debates. However, it is also evident that trade has increased among the three countries, and that the manufacturing sector especially in the Mexican Border has increased considerably, but these positive results have not addressed the environmental problems, labor conditions, and workers’ rights issues.
Another interesting effect of NAFTA in the Mexican economy is its role in the peso crisis. Because of market deregulations, “on 20 December 1994, the Mexican government decided to let the peso float. By the end of January 1995, the peso had lost 50% of its value.”
[47] Today it is evident that deregulated financial flows can destabilize regional economies in the process of integration. In Mexico, a number of domestic policy errors and external shocks contributed to the economic crisis. But the most important mistake was excessive reliance in NAFTA’s highly liquid sources of foreign savings to finance long-term development.[48]But not all are bad news; the other side of the story indicates that the growth of trade thanks to NAFTA allowed Mexico to recuperate quickly from its economic crisis. In fact, Mexican economic output reached pre-crisis levels in two years.[49]However, this quick recovery is also attributed o the U.S. economic aid. The U.S. aware that the peso crisis may affect trade and Mexico’s purchasing power, and aware that American jobs and investments may be affected decided to help Mexico with an economic package of $40 billion.[50]
The mixed results of NAFTA without a doubt will continue to have two contradicting groups; one that favors it and claims that it is beneficial for the parties’ national economies, the other that opposes and claims that it is devastating the most vulnerable sectors of society, like the campesinos in Mexico, and manufacture workers in the United States.
One thing that does not seem clear is how constitutional or unconstitutional NAFTA is. Article 2, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution requires treaties to be approved by two thirds of the Senate. The Constitution reads, “The President shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.”
[51] But despite this provision, NAFTA was approved as a congressional-executive agreement by simple minorities in both houses.[52]
Why the Constitutional question was never raised? A review of history clarifies the answer to this question. “Just like other congressional-executive agreements that took place since the New Deal, NAFTA became a symbol of new-fangled internationalist entanglements.”[53]”The founders’ ‘antidemocratic’ and ‘outmoded’ decision to privilege ‘one third plus one’ of the Senate no longer monopolizes our constitutional vision. It remains available as an option but is not longer a requirement.”[54]
According to the relevant literature it looks like that the birth of the congressional-executive agreements came to be not as a result of amending the Constitution but as a self-conscious ad hoc process. Especially during the last forty years, Congress consolidated this practice by passing status that used the congressional-executive agreement as a tool for the control of foreign policy.[55]
The roots of this practice can be found in The Trade Act of 1974. “The Trade Act transformed the congressional-executive agreement into a highly sophisticated tool for modern diplomacy.”[56]Therefore, even though the Constitution was never amended, NAFTA cannot be considered unconstitutional because, “the Trade Act provides a dynamic framework through which Congress can give effective advice before the President signs on the dotted line…, the Trade Act insists that the President consult with all relevant congressional committees, include members of Congress in American negotiating delegation, and provide ninety-day notice on an intention to sign any agreement.”[57]
Despite the mixed results I would like to conclude by saying that NAFTA has not live up to its promise as it is outlined in Chapter I, Article, 101, objective two which reads - promote conditions of fair competition. There is not fairness where a campesino from Mexico has to compete with a U.S. or Canadian corporation. There is not fairness, in stimulating one sector of the economy and denying the benefits of the agreement to the most vulnerable sectors; in Mexico this is what happened to the Maize producers and agricultural workers in general. Finally, It cannot be denied that in Mexico as a result of this agreement a good number of people from the most vulnerable sectors of society not only had to leave their agricultural practice but the country itself, and emigrate illegally to the United States.






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Cameron, Maxwell A. and Aggarwal, Vinod K. “Mexican Meltdown: States, Market, and Post-NAFTA Financial Turmoil.” December, 1996: Third World Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 5. Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

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Mace, Gordon. Regionalism and the State: NAFTA and Foreign Policy Convergence. Canada: Ashgate, 2007

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[1] NAFTA, Art. 102: Objectives.
[2] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 116
[3] S. Hrg. 102-1175. “NAFTA: The Hidden Costs of Free Trade.” Hearing before the subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate; One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session. October 16, 1992 p 21
[4] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 117
[5] Avery, William P. “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining.” Summer 1998: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 2. Published by: The Academy of Political Science. p 284
[6] Nafta charter, chapter 20 article 2001; the free trade commission and article 2002; the Secretariat.
[7] Nafta charter, chapter 20 article 2001; the free trade commission and article 2002; the Secretariat.
[8] KU, Charlotte and Diehl Paul. International Law; Classic and Contemporary Readings. Second ed. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Colorado U.S.A. 2003.
[9] KU, Charlotte and Diehl Paul. International Law; Classic and Contemporary Readings. Second ed. Lynne Reinner Publishers, Colorado U.S.A. 2003.
[10] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 429
[11] NAFTA Charter, Chapter XI
[12] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 429
[13] NYU School of Law. The NAFTA and Political Economy of Regionalism. Htpp://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/990205.html. p 2, 3
[14] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 438
[15] Avery, William P. “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining.” Summer 1998: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 2. Published by: The Academy of Political Science. p 287
[16] Avery, William P. “Domestic Interests in NAFTA Bargaining.” Summer 1998: Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 113, No. 2. Published by: The Academy of Political Science. p 289
[17] David G. Abler, and Daniel Pick. “NAFTA, Agriculture, and the Environment in Mexico.” August 1993: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 75, No. 3. Blackwell Publishing. p 794
[18] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 440
[19] Knox, John H. “The 2005 Activity of the NAFTA Tribunals.” April 2006: The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 100, No. 2. Published by: American Society of International Law. p 440
[20] Smith, Gery. “NAFTA: Two Mexicos, Two Outcomes.” February 13, 2008: Section: Top News. Htpp://www.BusinessWeekOnline.org. p 1
[21] Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 119
[22] S. Hrg. 106-751 “Lesson of NAFTA For the U.S. Relations with the Americas.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism of the Committee on Foreign Relations; United State Senate; One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 27, 2000. p 4
[23] p S. Hrg. 106-751 “Lesson of NAFTA For the U.S. Relations with the Americas.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism of the Committee on Foreign Relations; United State Senate; One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 27, 2000. 10
[24] p S. Hrg. 106-751 “Lesson of NAFTA For the U.S. Relations with the Americas.” Hearing before the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Peace Corps, Narcotics and Terrorism of the Committee on Foreign Relations; United State Senate; One Hundred Sixth Congress, Second Session, April 27, 2000.23
[25] The Economist. “Tequila Slammer. The Peso Crisis, ten years on Mexico has still not fully recovered from its worst financial crisis.” Section: Finance and Economics. January, 2005: Economist, Vol. 374, Issue 8407. p 1
[26] Blank Stephen, and Jerry Haar. Making NAFTA Work: U.S. Firms and the New North American Business Environment. Florida: North-South Center Press, 1998. P 67
[27] S. Hrg. 102-1175. “NAFTA: The Hidden Costs of Free Trade.” Hearing before the subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate; One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session. October 16, 1992 p 1
[28] S. Hrg. 102-1175. “NAFTA: The Hidden Costs of Free Trade.” Hearing before the subcommittee on Labor and Human Resources, United States Senate; One Hundred Second Congress, Second Session. October 16, 1992 p 3
[29]Robey, John S. “Civil Society and NAFTA.” September 1999: Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 565. No. Civil Society and Democratization. p 117
[30] Aland de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet, Benjamin Davis. December 1995:“NAFTA’s Impact on Mexico: Rural Household-Level Effects.” American Journal of Agriculture Economies, Vol. 77, No. 5, Proceedings Issue. Blackwell Publishing. p 1283
[31] Smith, Gery. “NAFTA: Two Mexicos, Two Outcomes.” February 13, 2008: Section: Top News. Htpp://www.BusinessWeekOnline.org. p 1
[32] p Bacon, David. The Children of NAFTA: Labor Wars on the U.S./Mexico Border. Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2004. p 223
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[51] U.S. Constitution. Art. II, cl. 2.
[52] Ackerman, Bruce and Golove, David. “Is NAFTA Constitutional.” February, 1995: Harvard Law Review, Vol. 108, No. 4. Published by: The Harvard Law Review Association. p 801
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