The Negative Effects of Globalization in Latin America

The Negative Effects of Globalization in Latin America
Since the 1980s, globalization has changed drastically both negatively and positively the life of millions of people around the world, and Latin America has not escaped this change. Globalization is not new, it “can be traced back at least to the 15th century, with the genesis of the capital world economy and the geographic expansion of division of labor, access to raw materials, industrial production, and the circulation of capital.”[1] However, in the last 30 years, the process of globalization has increased in an unprecedented speed, and today, it involves so many reforms that simply some governments are unable to adjust themselves to these policies, and as a result governments see their sovereignty and power vanish away.
Unlike in the past, today, “globalization is a process that affects the traditional territorial political space and its associated claim to sovereignty. It represents an increase and intensification or worldwide connectedness, with some decline on the significance of territoriality and state structures.”[2]
In order to better understand these changes, this paper is designed to analyze the impact that globalization has in Latin America; to point out its negative effects, to criticize its policy requirements, and to understand the neoliberal policies promoted by the Washington Consensus (WC), and multinational corporations (MNCs), and specially the “structural adjustment policies” (SAPs) that the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank (WB), promote when assisting Latin American economic problems.
All over the world, - including the developed countries - but especially in Latin America, globalization has been accelerating social polarization. “This occurs when an increased percentage of national income or wealth is concentrated in the hands of a few people.”[3] Polarizing in Latin America is evident, for example, according to the WB, “about 46 percent of Latin American population fell below the poverty line and 22 percent below the indigence line in 1990, as compared to 41 percent and 19 percent in 1980.”[4]
How can poverty increase despite all the potential benefits of globalization? What has Latin America done that the benefits of globalization are not coming to its people? Who are responsible for the region’s economic problems? The governments? The structural adjustment policies of the IMF and the WB? The neo-liberal policies promoted by the “Washington Consensus”? Or a mixture of all? To answer these questions, it is necessary to take a close look of the impact of the neoliberal policies promoted by the “Washington Consensus”, and the structural adjustment policies promoted by the IMF, and the WB since the 1980s.
The effects of globalization in Latin America can be felt in three different areas. First, the economy, whereby social arrangements for the production, exchange distribution, and consumption of goods and services take place. Second, the polity, involving the organized exchange of coercion and surveillance coupled with institutional transformations. And third, the cultural, where we see the social arrangements for the production, exchange and expression of symbols that represent meaning, beliefs, tastes and values.[5]
Although the cultural effects of globalization are very important, in this paper the aim is to analyze and concentrate more in the effects of globalization in the economic and political areas.
Latin American governments adopted the policies of the “Washington Consensus” in the final years of the 1980s as a reaction to the macroeconomic crisis that hit the region and some other developing regions during this time. In the mid of such crisis, the “Washington Consensus” seemed to offer a strategy for development, and its “policies focused on minimizing the role of the government, emphasizing privatization, trade and capital market liberalization, and deregulation. Governments had a role in maintaining macro-stability, but the attention was on price stability rather than output stability, employment or growth. There was a large set of dos and don’ts; do privatize everything, from factories to social security; don’t have the government involved in promoting particular industries; do strength property rights; don’t be corrupt. Minimizing government meant lowering taxes – but keeping budgets in balance.”[6]
Then, it is evident, that Latin America adopted the “Washington Consensus” because as high inflation broke out in many of the countries, its policies focused on fighting high inflation and other financial problems. For Latinos, their governments have not been working well, and the appeal that the WC’s policies would minimize the role of the government made them desirable. But soon the negative effects of these policies were felt.
Argentina a country that adopted the WC’s policies in its totality was praised, and the IMF together with the WB claimed credit for the revitalization of the Argentina’s economy. But, as it turned out, the growth was not sustainable. Growth was based on heavy borrowing from abroad, and on privatization which sold off financial assets to foreigners – the proceeds from which were not invested. There was a consumption boom. GDP was increasing, but national wealth was diminishing. Growth was to last a short seven years, and was to be follow by recession and stagnation.[7]
Argentina is not the only country that adopted the WC’s policies in Latin America. Neo-liberalism came to Bolivia in 1985, when the government privatized most state-owned industries, and cut social services. Although manufacturing grew during this time, it soon became fragmented and decentralized into small workshops, therefore, destroying the once powerful unions. Between 1989 and 1996, the number of permanent jobs dropped from 71 percent to just 29 percent of all employment. But despite all these negative effects, the IMF praised Bolivia as one of Latin America’s best examples of globalization.[8] Twenty years later, Bolivia is the poorest country in South America.
The application of structural adjustment policies in Latin America is polarizing the region in several major areas. First, unemployment rates have grown dramatically as public sector employment is cut and domestic companies are forced to downsize their workforce in the face of increase international competition in local economies. Second, downward pressure on wage-labor rates as a consequence of globalization tends to reduce the real minimum wage and thus the level of household income for the majority. Third, the urban formal economy continues to shirk in many of the region’s largest cities and the informal economy has expanded as structural adjustment programs bring greater production flexibility to the marketplace. Fourth, agricultural policies that are export-oriented and geared toward production rationalization are exacerbating the marginalization of the rural poor. And fifth, the time-space compression technologies that drive globalization are accessible generally to the elite segment of society and not to the poorer majority.[9]
Today, it is evident that “the economic restructuring, liberalization, technological changes, and fierce competition, both in the markets for goods and labor, that went with globalization have contributed to increased impoverishment, inequalities, work insecurity, weakening of institutions and social support systems, the erosion of social identities and values. Liberalization and reduced protection of agriculture, by reducing agriculture supplies, the price of food, and the amount of money that food importing countries pay for their imports has increased.[10]
In Latin America, the neoliberal policies of the WC, the IMF, and the WB have had a profound negative effect. For example, fiscal adjustment which is part of the IMF structural adjustment program has mainly been implemented at the cost of social expenditure, even though some Latin American countries dedicated 18 percent of GDP to their social budget and most of them less than 10 percent.[11]
The global operations of multinational corporations (MNCs) have played a major role in the expansion of international trade and the emergence of regional trading blocs since the 1980s.[12] Yet, despite the record profits that these MNCs have made in the last few years, investment in Latin America has not grown as much as inequality has. If the objective of the MNCs is to maximize profits as some people claim,[13] then, a national government must have the power to regulate these MNCs and be able to channel some of the profits to the benefit of its people. But, according to the neo-liberal policies, a government must play a minor role in regulating the market, because it is assumed that the market regulates itself.
The idea behind neo-liberalism is that the market operating freely and unencumbered by regulations, will allocate resources more efficiently than the state is able to, and it is assumed that this ultimately will benefit everyone, including the poor.[14] However, after almost thirty years that Latin America opened up to the neoliberal policies there is no evidence that the market is regulating itself, instead as it was stated before, there is polarization, poverty is growing, and resentment towards globalization and the policies implemented by the IMF, the WB and other international Organizations (IO) can be seen all over the region, to the point that in the last seven years a good part of the region has turn to the left, which has been promising to regulate the role of MNCs, and financial institutions in the region.
The new leaders in Latin American have been reacting to the neo-liberal policies promoted by Washington. Neo-liberal policies are a set of market-based structural adjustment reforms mandated by international financial institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank. These policies are “intended” to bring about economic stabilization, reduce inflation, and promote growth.[15] But as we examine the history of these financial institutions and their involvement in Latin America we see that these promises were never delivered.
Financial Institutions
The World Summit on Social development that took place in Copenhagen in 1995, declared; “we commit ourselves to ensuring that when structural adjustment programs are agreed to, they include social development goals, in particular eradicating poverty, promoting full and productive employment, and enhancing social integration.” Furthermore, in the summit was also promised that financial institutions that would promote structural adjustment policies would; first, promote basic social programs and expenditures, in particular those affecting the poor and vulnerable segments of society. Second, review the impact of structural adjustment programs on social development. Third, promote in the countries with economies in transition, an integrated approach to the transformation process. Fourth, design policies to promote more equitable and enhanced access to income and resources, and fifth, ensure that women do not bear a disproportionate burden of the transitional costs of such processes.[16]
Even though a great number of promises were made during the World Summit in 1995, today it is evident that in Latin America, “SAPs imposed a logic that favors speculation instead of production, which impedes sustained growth and eventually lead to recession as a result of the interaction between several vicious cycles.”[17] These vicious cycles include; first, the main priority of the SAPs is to warrant payment of the service of the foreign debt which depends of capital flow from abroad and requires high interest rates. Second, the abrupt liberalization of trade and capital flow destroys local productive capacities and leads to unemployment, salary/wage reduction and depression of the domestic market, all of which deters productive investment particularly in the presence of high interest rates. Third, growth tends to cause a deficit in the balance of payment which could only be compensated for by an increase in capital flow or recessive measures. Since inflation control generally is established through a fixed exchange rate or a controlled slack devolution, sooner or later there begins speculation against the local currency, capital flight, devaluation and recession.[18]
Despite all the promises made during the World Summit, today, as before 1995, globalization in Latin America can be felt not by the economic growth, but by the presence of financial institutions, and, by the devastating “application of neoliberal structural adjustment programs that promote export-led development.”[19] “Export-led development is the theoretical policy thrust behind globalization, and globalization depends on the replacement of import-substitution by export-led development as favored development strategy of international lending institutions and national governments.”[20]
It is clear then, that the structural adjustment policies were accepted in the region because governments were advised that “the only manner to survive in globalization is to be competitive at any cost, and that the only road to economic growth are exports, [in the last 30 years], almost all countries of the region have adopted structural adjustment programs (SAPs) imposed from above by governments and from abroad by international financial agencies that have the purpose to promote and support a new pattern of accumulation based on the export of manufactured goods. Those policies are both caused by and condition for a specific form of globalization dominated by the interests of large multinational corporations and financial groups that express new international as well as national power relations.”[21]
Structural adjustment policies do not only involve economics, but they also require significant reform of the state itself. Social reform of the state is crucial to social policy, since it redefines the conception of how to satisfy social needs and involves all major welfare institutions.[22]
The reformation of the state in Latin America means that “the power of national governments and their ability to make national policies and pay for social services has been reduced without a corresponding increase in supra-national government or effective international cooperation.”[23] With many of the state reforms, “national governments have renounced the instruments that are necessary to direct the national economic process and to protect production and employment. Simultaneously, their international bargaining capacity has been weakened. Liberalization and dependency on foreign capital in order to equalize the balance of payments have made Latin American economies highly vulnerable to financial speculation and external shocks.”[24]
If there is something that is evident in Latin America after 30 years of neoliberal policies, it is the accumulation of the external debt and the lack of investment in social programs. Latin American countries despite their indebtedness are eligible for ever larger loans from international lending institutions. More international loans mean the repayment of ever larger debts by countries increasingly unable to pay them.[25]
Flow of capital that is not directed to social programs is a burden to most people in Latin America. The money has a high interest rate and must be repaid in time according to the rules established during the moment of the loan. But how can Latinos pay huge amounts of money when globalization has affected them in so many ways? “The answer is simple. – The borrower – the national government – increases taxes and cuts domestic spending, pushing the country’s impoverished populations into the black whole of poverty.”[26] Can you imagine a country cutting social spending when to begin with, it dedicates less than 10 percent of its GDP to the social budget?
The large flow of capital that goes to the region is conditioned, and local governments cannot invest the money in the areas that they feel that need immediate assistance. Both the IMF and the WB are good in making conditional loans. The IMF focuses on macroeconomic policies and the WB in microeconomic policies; in the case of tax policy their conditions for loans are quite complementary. For instance, the IMF – rather than the WB – calls explicitly for fiscal stabilization, but it is the WB that is more involved in the nuts and bolts of tax reforms in Latin American nations. As such, the IMF’s call for fiscal balance and the WB’s call for market-conforming tax reforms are quite complementary.”[27]
Today, governments in Latin America have lost part of their power to decide about their own economic policies; but things get worse, at the present, “international lending institutions provide one set of solutions for a variety of complex needs and problems occurring in widely different countries as they seek the incorporation of all regional economies into a massive global system”[28] It is a shame that one set of solutions is being applied to so many different problems in Latin America, but as if that was not enough, today, the policies are not even the result of a careful analysis of the economic situation in at least one country of the region, but instead “the IMF programs are typically dictated from Washington, and shaped by the short mission during which its staff members pore over numbers in the finance ministries and central banks and make themselves comfortable if five-star hotels in the capitals”[29]
With one set of “solutions” to all problems the directives of the IMF seem to believe, “what the financial community views as good for the global economy is good for the global economy and should be done.”[30] Based on the decisions of the IMF, it is evident that the institution pursues the interests of the financial community instead of the welfare of millions of Latin Americans.[31]
“Proponents of globalization are of one voice in their attack on the welfare state which is too expensive in world terms and has therefore outlived its usefulness.”[32] These people favored the structural adjustments policies promoted by Washington through the IMF, and the World Bank. These financial institutions have done a good job in portraying their policies as benign and desirable in developing countries. “We read everywhere today that international integration is proceeding rapidly as the result of increase flow of trade, capital, money, direct investment, technology, people, information and ideas across national borders.”[33] We hear that things are changing rapidly and that today everyone has the opportunity to get the potential benefits of globalization. But one hardly hears that “adjustment to free trade and globalization are costly and may not always be wholly desirable.”[34]
Globalization in a good part of the media is portrayed as something that has benefited millions of people all over the world – and indeed it has at least in some regions –. But today, there is a blind assumption that globalization is good for everyone. The assumption is that if globalization works for the Units States, for the European Union, or for China, then the developing countries can also get the potential benefits of it. However, the social, political, and economic problems in the developing countries not always facilitates the access to the benefits that globalization may bring. Furthermore, the size, the infrastructure, and the lack of technology of these countries, deny the possibility of getting the potential benefits of free trade and globalization in the same way that industrialize countries get.
The opening of Latin American markets to the international community is not a guaranty that things will improve. In most countries as it was stated before, the local economies just vanished away as a result of their inability to compete with huge multinational corporations. Furthermore, industrialized countries do not really seek to trade with the region. For instance, 80 percent of international trade and 75 percent of foreign direct investment takes place among Japan, the European Union, and the NAFTA area, with another 16.5 percent going into the new industrialized countries.[35]
In other words, the Latin American economies are opening their markets not because they are able to sell their products abroad, but because they are hopeful that foreign direct investment would flow into the area, but as it was juts stated, the major exchange of trade happens in the countries of the north and the developing countries are useful as long as they can provide the raw materials and the natural resources to keep the economy of developed nations functioning.
Even though trade between the Latin American countries and the developed nations is not very significant, the neo-liberal policies promoted by the financial institutions and Washington emphasize in trade liberalization. “Trade liberalization is supposed to enhance a country’s income by forcing resources to move from less productive uses to more productive uses; as economists would say, utilizing comparative advantage. But moving resources from low-productivity uses to zero productivity does not enrich a country, and this is what happened all too often under the IMF programs.”[36] Today, even the IMF agrees that it has pushed the agenda too far, and that the liberalization of capital and financial markets contributed to the global financial crises of the 1990s.[37]
The immediate effects of trade liberalization in Latin America have not been an increase in the number of jobs available. Instead, trade liberalization has easily destroyed jobs as inefficient industries close down under pressure from international competition. Certainly, the ideology of the IMF that more productive jots would be created as the old inefficient jobs that have been created behind protectionist walls are eliminated seems no to be true in Latin America.[38]
Besides the insignificant trade – as compared to other regions – that happens between Latin America and the developed nations, there is another difference in the way investment is made in Latin America. “When compared with investors in advanced industrial economies, investors in Latin American nations have incentives to invest in liquid assets. Such assets are easily moved in conditions of political uncertainty, volatile macroeconomic performance, poor economic information, and other characteristics common to developing nations.”[39]
But investment in liquid assets is not the only problem in Latin America. Today, globalization allows the free movement of capital from one part of the globe to another in a matter of seconds, and investors aware of this possibility threaten government with an exit option. “Exit threats are accentuated by the fact that much investment in developing nations takes place in product markets, such as assembly and intermediate manufacturing, where pure cost considerations are crucial to competiveness. In such contexts, taxes on corporate income threaten thin profit margins and augment the exit threat of asset holders, therefore increasing pressure for governments to abandon progressive tax systems.”[40]
Once again, here one sees that globalization has undermine the power of the Latin American governments, and the insistence of neo-liberal policies of limited government makes things even easier for multinational corporation to do what they please in the region. If a government stands up and threatens to tax a multinational corporation it will reply back by threatening to leave the country and would claim that its contributions is already benefiting the country with the number of jobs that are created as a result of the operations of the corporation in such country.
Liberalization of trade is supposed to bring benefits to everyone. Powerful nations together with intergovernmental organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) for example, have been careful in portraying themselves as benign ones, to the extent that sometimes they have claimed that developing countries should be treated differently. Honoring this claim, developed countries are allowed, for instance, to deviate from the most favored nation principle by allowing lower tariffs on imports from developing countries –. However, even with this so called “preferential treatment,” developed countries’ tariffs against imports from developing countries are four times higher than tariffs against goods produced by other developed countries.[41]
Liberalization of trade and the sudden opening of a small economy - as most of Latin American economies are – to the international arena without taking the necessary precautions and with a weak government unable to dictate its economic policies have devastated the Latin American economies. “When trade liberalization – the lowering of tariffs and elimination of protectionist measures – is done in the right way and at the right pace, so that new jobs are created as inefficient jobs are destroyed, there can be significant efficiency gains.”[42] However, the structural adjustments policies promoted by the IMF and the World Bank, together with other neo-liberal policies promoted by the WC do not allow an steady adjustment of the Latin American economies to the international arena, because an immediate opening of the market is emphasized with the claim that as soon as the economy is open, it can start to have the benefits of trade liberalization.
The effects of globalization can be seen all over Latin America. In the region today, “the process of globalization is seen as blurring national boundaries, shifting solidarities within and between nation-states, and deeply affecting the constitutions of national and inter-groups identities.”[43]
The blurring of national boundaries is evident with the amount of economic flow that goes in and out of the countries. “Between 1980 and 1994, for instance, net capital flow to all developing nations increased by nearly 300 percent.”[44] Today there is no doubt that such flows of money have had a great impact in domestic politics, and at the same time have made the economies of Latina American countries susceptible to the sudden shift of the flows of money that comes and leaves the region.
Some people still assume that globalization only involves trade, technology, and investment. A closer look of globalization reveals that it involves more than that, - like the free flow of labor for example. The flow of people in the industrialized countries has not only given them more but also better opportunities. But, “the outstanding aspect of globalization in Latin America is the confrontation of a new world economy with the liberalization of flow of financial and industrial capital, while the mobility of labor from south to north is increasingly controlled.”[45] Yet, despite integration being a key element influenced by globalization, most analysis of the levels of economic integration pay attention to trade and investment but neglect to consider the free flow of labor in any form.[46]
As a result of the free movement of capital and the restricted movement of labor from the South to North about 80 percent of the world’s population lives in developing countries – a good number of that in Latin America – marked by low income and high poverty, high unemployment and low education. For those countries, globalization presents both unprecedented risks and - for the dominant elites - opportunities. Making globalization work in ways that enrich all requires making it work for people in developing nations.[47]
The free flow of capital and the restricted movement of labor have widened the gap between developed and developing nations. Restrictions on the movement of labor, the neoliberal policies promoted by Washington, and the structural adjustment policies of the financial institutions have created an economic model that “has had a negative impact on the distribution of income and wealth; on employment and wages; and on provisions of public benefits and services. Consequently, poverty has increased and social welfare has been eroded. The structural adjustment policies have led to concentration of income among rich households at the expense of the majority of households.[48]
To have an idea of the household inequality in Latin America perhaps is good to remember that the richest 10 percent of households pocket twice the income of the poorest 40 percent of household in Argentina and Mexico, three times in Chile, four times in Brazil and 1.7 times in Venezuela. In all these countries, income distribution is substantially worse than a decade ago.[49] So the questions are, in what ways the majority of people in Latin America have seen the benefits of globalization? Where are the benefits that trade liberalization was supposed to bring to everyone? Would it be more appropriate to have a government that has more control in the economy and national policies? I certainly believe so.
There are six critical issues that are seen as a consequence of globalization in Latin America. First, growing polarization; second, limited democracy, - accepting neo-liberal policies means accepting economic decisions that are made by the market, the corporations and newly emerging global and regional institutions like the IMF, the WB, WTO, MERCOSUR, etc. Third, opportunistic migration and labor flow, - over the past two decades, the global restructuring of production has changed both the magnitude and geography of migration, particular in terms of labor flows from the economies of the South to the developed countries in the North. The demand for skilled workers in the developed nations is “brain draining” the economies of the South. Fourth, conflicting socio-cultural identities; socio-cultural identities have always been influenced to some degree by external forces, either directly through colonization and imperialism or indirectly by trade and other interactions. Fifth, adverse accessibility and mobility; millions of Latin Americans suffer today from inadequate accessibility and mobility, both in terms of their ability to access new opportunities and services and their physical mobility in rural and urban environments. And sixth, lower environmental quality; the ongoing and worsening degradation of the physical environment perhaps is the most serious immediate threat to development in the region.[50]
There is no point in denying the potential benefits that globalization can bring to a society. But for these benefits to be a reality in Latin America an active role of the government is required. Both the government and the market must work together to enhance the benefits of globalization. If things continue to be as they are now, polarization and not integration will be the result of globalization in the area.
In closing, it can be stated that there are five main reasons why Latin Americans are skeptical of globalization. First, the rules of the game that govern globalization are unfair, specifically designed to advance the industrialized countries. Second, globalization advances material values over other values, such as concern for the environment of for life itself. Third, the way globalization has been managed has taken away much of the developing countries’ sovereignty, and their ability to make key decisions themselves in key areas that affect their citizens well being. Fourth, while the advocates of globalization have claimed that everyone will benefit economically, there is plenty of evidence from both developing and developed countries that there are many losers in both. And fifth, the economic system that has been pressed upon the developing countries – in some cases essentially forced upon them – is inappropriate and often grossly damaging. Globalization should not mean the Americanization of either economic policy or culture, but often it does, and that has caused resentment.[51]
Almost 30 years of neoliberal policies have devastated the Latin American region. As a response to it, in the last seven years Latin America has witnessed the return of left-wing governments to power. These governments who have been democratically elected have promised to gradually stop their dependency in international financial institutions like the IMF and the WB, and they have declared themselves enemies of the “Washington Consensus” and the neoliberal policies.
Resentment toward the way globalization is working is not only voiced in Latin America, but also all over the rest of the developing nations around the world. Even leaders like the former “France’s president Jack Chirac, have expressed concern that globalization is not making life better for those most in need of its promised benefits.”[52]
To get the potential benefits of globalization, Latin American “governments must have an active role in both promoting development and protecting the poor. Economic theory and historical experience provide guidance in what governments must do. While markets are at the center of any successful economy, [a] government has to create a climate that allows business to thrive and create jobs, it has to construct physical and institutional infrastructure, laws ensuring, for instance, a sound banking system and security markets in which investors can have confidence that they are not being cheated. Poorly developed markets are marked by monopolies; high prices in a vital area like telecommunications hinder development, so governments must have strong competition policies.”[53]
To improve the lives of millions of people in the developing world and therefore in Latin America, globalization must be reformed. Reforming globalization would require; first, make globalization fair for everyone, - trying this way to eliminate the pervasiveness of poverty. Second, globalization must also promote foreign assistance and debt relief. Third, globalization must make trade fair for everyone. Fourth, governments must have the capacity to limit liberalization. Fifth, globalization must not only seek economic profits but also promote the preservation of the environment. And sixth, leaders must fix the flawed system of global governance.[54]
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[1] Keeling, David J. “Latin America Development and the Globalization Imperative.” New Directions, Family Crisis 2004: Journal of Latin America Geography. p 3
2Orozco, Manuel. “Globalization and Migration.” The Impact of Family Remittances in Latin America. 1992: Latin America Politics and Society. Vol. 44, No. 2 p 42
3 Keeling, David J. “Latin America Development and the Globalization Imperative.” New Directions, Family Crisis 2004: Journal of Latin America Geography. p 3
4 Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 309




[5] Marden, Peter. The Decline of Politics. England: Ashagate Publishing Limited, 2003. p 4
[6] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. p 27
[7] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. p 36
[8] Harris, Jerry. “Bolivia and Venezuela.” The democratic dialectic in new revolutionary movements. http://rac.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/49/1/1. p 11
[9] Keeling, David J. “Latin America Development and the Globalization Imperative.” New Directions, Family Crisis 2004: Journal of Latin America Geography. p 12
[10] Streeten, Paul. Globalization; Threat or Opportunity? Herdon, VA: Copehagen Business School Press, 2001. P 27
[11] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 308
[12] Keeling, David J. “Latin America Development and the Globalization Imperative.” New Directions, Family Crisis 2004: Journal of Latin America Geography. p 4
[13] Pennar, Karen. “The World of theMultinationals.” The New York Times, 27 Feb. 1994. p BR 16
[14] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P18
[15] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P17
[16] Grumber, Isabelle. Globalization, the United Nations Development Dialogue. New York: United Nations University Press, 200. p 6
[17] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 309
[18] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 310
[19] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 306
[20] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P18
[21] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 307
[22] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 308
[23] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P115
[24] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 307

[25] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P17
[26] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P17
[27] Wibbels, Erick. “Taxation and Burden Shift in Latin America.” 2003: International Organization. Vol. 57, No 1 p 122
[28] Lynn Denis, Daly Heyck. Surviving Globalization in Three Latin American Countries. Canada: AGMV Marquis, 2002. P17
[29] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 24
[30] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 195
[31] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 206
[32] Marden, Peter. The Decline of Politics. England: Ashagate Publishing Limited, 2003. p 1
[33] Streeten, Paul. Globalization; Threat or Opportunity? Herdon, VA: Copehagen Business School Press, 2001. P 11
[34] Streeten, Paul. Globalization; Threat or Opportunity? Herdon, VA: Copehagen Business School Press, 2001. P 10
[35] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 307
[36] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 59
[37] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 59
[38] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 59
[39] Wibbels, Erick. “Taxation and Burden Shift in Latin America.” 2003: International Organization. Vol. 57, No 1 p 117
[40] Wibbels, Erick. “Taxation and Burden Shift in Latin America.” 2003: International Organization. Vol. 57, No 1 p 117
[41] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. p 82
[42] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 53
[43] Torres, Carlos A & Daniel Schugurensky. “The political economy of higher education in the era of neoliberal globalization: Latin American in comparative perspective.” 2002: Higher Educatheligal Pract. P 430
[44] Wibbels, Erick. “Taxation and Burden Shift in Latin America.” 2003: International Organization. Vol. 57, No 1 p 113
[45] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 306
[46] Orozco, Manuel. “Globalization and Migration.” The Impact of Family Remittances in Latin America. 1992: Latin America Politics and Society. Vol. 44, No. 2 p 41
[47] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. p 26
[48] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 310
[49] Laurell, Cristina Asa. “Structural Adjustment and the Globalization of Social Policy in Latin America.” 2000: International Sociology. Vol. 15, No. 2 p 310
[50] Keeling, David J. “Latin America Development and the Globalization Imperative.” New Directions, Family Crisis 2004: Journal of Latin America Geography. p 10
[51] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. p 9
[52] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Globalization and its Discontents. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002. P 4
[53] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. p 27
[54] Stiglitz, Joseph E. Making Globalization Work. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. p 13

Ecuador-Peru Boundary Dispute: Liberal and Realist Explanation

Ecuador-Peru Boundary Dispute:
Liberal and Realist Explanation
The boundary dispute between Ecuador and Peru has been a painful experience that nationals from both countries have had to endure. “The dispute is not only one of the major international issues of Latin America, but it is also dangerous, because it’s long history has clothed it with considerations of national prestige and honor and because it involves a very considerable extent of territory with which neither country is willing to depart.”[1] The boundary disputes between these two countries can be traced back to colonial days and are due largely to the uncertainty as to the limits of colonial territorial divisions.[2]
During colonial time, the King of Spain sent voluminous instructions to his overseas officials. These instructions were called cedulas and they “often involved the transfer of territory from one jurisdiction to another, but they were in many instances so ambiguous, inconsistent, or openly contradictory to other decrees that the royal officials were unable to reconcile their instructions and thus left them unexecuted.”[3] Furthermore, from a physiographical point of view, the border between Ecuador and Peru lacks decisive natural boundaries that can facilitate the drawing of political frontiers.[4]
The Spanish domination in the American continent was divided into two administrative areas; the Viceroyalty of New Spain (Mexico) established in 1535, and the Viceroyalty of Peru which was established in 1542 and was divided into eleven audiences – among them was the Viceroyalty of New Granada.[5] The cedula of 1802 separated for ecclesiastical purposes the provinces of Mainas and Quijos, except Papallacta, from the Viceroylaty of New Granada and transferred them to the Viceroyalty of Peru. This decree aimed to improve the Spanish mission in the area today known to Peruvians as the Department of Amazonas and Loreto, and to Ecuadorians as the Oriente.[6] Peruvians claim that this cedula transferred territory to the Viceroyalty of Peru, but on the other hand, “the Ecuadorians attack the claims of Peru based on the Cedula of 1802 on the ground that it did not separate the territory of Maynas from the Viceroyalty of New Granada and add it to that of Peru; for the decree was merely intended as an administrative measure for ecclesiastical purposes and did not signify formal transfer of political power….Ecuadorians also contend that in ‘colonial days changes of jurisdiction were often made without involving alterations of territory’…furthermore, Ecuadorians contend that the report of 1799 requested two separations; that of government, and that of territory. However, the King of Spain ordered that only the first of the two requests should be carried out.[7]
Because each party espouses a position that diverges sharply from the other, the boundary dispute has not been resolved and it has led to wars between these two countries in 1941, 1981, and 1995. (Due to limited space in this paper, I will not talk about the 1981 Paquisha War, because it was very small.) Since one conflict led to the other by leaving the dispute unsettled, this paper aims to explain these conflicts from the point of view of realism and liberalism. With each perspective I will try to explain among other things; anarchy as a potential source of conflict, the security dilemma, the validity of internal law, the role of the state and of individuals (governments), and the role that the Organization of American States (OAS) played during and after the conflict.
From the point of view of realists the 1941 war between Ecuador and Peru can be explained by the structure of the international system. Realists argue that the international system is anarchical and that “wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them.”[8] Realists would claim that despite the diplomatic efforts that were made in order to avoid conflict, the war in 1941 occurred because there is no a strong central international authority that can induce Ecuador and Peru into obedience and force them to settle their dispute pacifically. Realists would also argue that we live in a world of self-help, and because of this condition they can explain that in 1941 Ecuador had no choice but defend itself event thought the Ecuadorian army was almost defenseless.[9] The fact that Ecuador lost almost half of its territory during this war only confirms the realists assumptions that in the international systems each state is on its own, that there is no central authority that can come to the defense of the weak state and restrict the aggressor, and that the international system is a system of self-help.
Liberals on the other hand recognize that the structure of the international system is anarchic, but they also claim that anarchy no necessarily drives a country to war. According to liberals states do cooperate in the anarchical world, and they do so because they realize that they will have continuous interactions with the same actors.[10] Liberals would claim that the 1941, 1981, and 1995 wars are not the result of anarchy, but the result of misunderstandings, miscommunications and the lack of trust in international institutions like the OAS that can help to find a peaceful solution to the conflict.
When the 1941 conflict erupted the battle was concentrated in Zarumilla-Chacras. “The Peruvian Colonel Manuel Odria decisively defeated the Ecuadorian forces who soon thereafter laid down their arms…shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, the United States, Brazil, and Argentina offered their friendly services as mediators of the conflict. At the conference of Western Hemisphere Foreign Ministers which met in Rio de Janeiro in January, 1942, the so called ‘Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Boundaries’ [also known as Rio Protocol] was drawn up and signed by the Foreign Ministers of the contracting parties and those of mediatory powers, to which Chile was added. Subsequently the Protocol was ratified, the Peruvian legislature voting for it unanimously, while an extraordinary Congress in Ecuador approved it on plurality basis.
“The boundary line which the protocol provided for not only caused Ecuador to lose two-thirds of the Oriente she had previously considered hers but also deprived her of an outlet to the Amazon River.”[11] In six years, from 1942 to 1948, the Ecuador-Peru Boundary Commission, with help of the guarantors of the Rio Protocol –United States, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina- was able to reach a definite demarcation of over 95% of the border without incident and in accordance to the Protocol stipulations.[12]
In explaining the lost of territory for part of Ecuador, realists would argue that “power prevails over justice in international politics [and that] necessity [of survival or self help] is the agent that overcomes moral obligations.”[13] In a world of self help, realists would say, “the strong [in this case Peru] do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.”[14]Realists would also contend that due to the lack of an international central authority “the weaker country [Ecuador] had little choice but to accept the outcome of the conference” in Rio de Janeiro.[15] Furthermore, realists would explain Peru’s behavior by saying that it wanted to maximize its aggregate power and was therefore predisposed to expansionist policies.[16] Realists argue that “it is the dynamic of the system which compel states to behave in certain ways if they wish to survive.”[17]
Liberals on the other hand would justify Peru’s actions by saying that “the actual occupation of the disputed [territory] for a long period lends much weight to the Peruvian claim to the region by the doctrine of prescription, recognized in international law and practical in international relations.”[18]
In trying to explain the ongoing border dispute, realists would claim that the conflicts between these two countries are the result of the security dilemma and the shifting balance of power. According to realists states “regard each other with suspicion, and they worry that war might be in the offing.…The basis of this fear is that in a world where [states] have the capability to attack each other and might have the motive to do so, any state bent on survival must be at least suspicious of other states and reluctant to trust them.”[19] From this point of view, realists seem to accurately explain the conflict between the aforementioned countries. For example, “by the early 1990s, internal political dynamics had come to favor Ecuador, historically the weaker party in the border dispute. At that time, Peru was experiencing the most profound domestic crisis in its modern history. Successive elected governments had failed to deal effectively with the multiple challenges of (1) obligations to come up with high repayments on its foreign debt, (2) severe internal economic problems, and (3) a serious threat from the Maoist guerrilla group known as Shining Path.”[20] Ecuador, aware that power has shifted in its favor and knowing that “from a military standpoint, Peru suffered from significant disadvantages, which made moving troops and supplies to the frontier exceedingly difficult”[21] took advantage in 1995 and allegedly infiltrate troops into Peruvian territory, perhaps hopping that this time it can get back part of the territory that lost in 1941 or at least settle the dispute under favorable terms.
In response to the Ecuadorian incursion, Peru even though it was ill prepare to retaliate the Ecuadorian troops, in a world of self-help took matters into its own hands first by probing and then by rushing into a confrontation in the jungle of La Cordillera del Condor.[22] However, this time “the fighting was limited, quite specifically, to the area under dispute in the Upper Cenepa Valley.”[23] – The remaining 5% of the border that was left unsettled by the Ecuador-Peru Commission in 1948.
The Upper Cenapa Valley had not been demarcated because “an anomaly that was not foreseen in the [Rio Treaty] arose after a mapping of the region, carried out by the US Army Corps, was completed in 1946…the aerial survey revealed that the high of the land that was to determine the border was not where the agreement had stipulated in one small section because of the presence of a previously uncharted river and a mountain spur.”[24] It is this area - the Cordillera del condor and the Cenepa River area,- which totals about 78 kilometers of the Zamora-Santiago-Yaupi Rivers segment, specified in the Rio Protocol that has been the primary focus of hostilities since 1942.[25]
Liberal scholars would claim that the beginning of hostilities for part of Ecuador in 1995 is not the result of the shifting balance of power, but the lack of desire from part of Ecuador to honor the procedure established in the Rio Protocol, and to respect the international law created by it. Liberals would claim that “the 1942 Protocol constitutes a treaty that is binding under international law and that consequently supersedes the earlier, 19th-century [agreements]” [26]For liberals, the Ecuadorian claim that part of the Rio the Janeiro Protocol cannot be executed due to the absence of a watershed between the Zamora and Santiago Rives[27] is inexcusable, because article 9 of the Rio Protocol says “the parties may, however, when the line is being laid out on the ground, grant such reciprocal concessions as they may consider advisable in order to adjust the line to geographical realities.”[28] Liberals “believe that it is possible to substantially reduce the scourge of war and to increase international prosperity” by respecting international law and by the creation of international organisms like the OAS that can help to deal with a variety of problems. Liberals would also contend that in so many cases international law constrains state’s behavior, and to prove this claim they will point out to the fact that since 1942 the two wars between Ecuador and Peru took place in the area that has not yet been demarcated. Since hostilities have stopped along the area that was demarcated by the Rio Protocol, liberals can claim that international law is effective.
Realists who have a different view of the value of international law would claim that when it comes to deciding whether to respect the law or to infringe it, states must always act according to their national interest. If it suits the state to respect international law, then it should be done so, if it violates its sovereignty or diminishes power or authority then the state or whoever acts on its behalf should not be concerned about morality or respect for the law. For realists international law is just another tool that states can use to advance their own agendas and to maximize their power. In a world that predisposition to cheat is always present; a state cannot take a chance by respecting international law without knowing how the other party or states will respond.
To defend their view about international law realists would point out that in 1942 the Ecuadorian government was forced to accept the terms of international law (Rio Protocol terms) because reluctance to do otherwise would have meant the persistence of the conflict when Ecuador was not able to defend itself. Realists would also point out the fact that when things were working better for the Ecuadorian government, “on August 17, 1960, President Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra of Ecuador again revived the boundary issue. ‘The Rio the Janeiro Protocol is null. We do not want war. But we will never acknowledge the Treaty of the Rio de Janeiro’”[29] By declaring that the Treaty is null Ecuador refused to acknowledge the validity of international law because it was no longer in the national interest to do so.
During the war of 1995, Ecuador again changed its view about the validity of international law created by the Rio Protocol. It is claim that this time Ecuador after gathering information about the rapid strength of the Peruvian army – once Peru had somewhat solved its domestic problems – chose to recognize the existence of the Treaty but claim that cannot be executed due to the problems aforementioned. Furthermore, Ecuador fearing another invasion and perhaps the lost of part of its territory not only recognize the Treaty but also called the guarantor countries to help solve the border dispute. The back and forth shift about the validity of international law for part of Ecuador indicates that it was incline to recognize the validity of the law during the time that it needed the most. Therefore, the realist claim that countries respect international law when is in their national interests seem to be correct at least in this case.
Realists would also point out that just like Ecuador; Peru violated international law when it was convenient to do so. When in 1941 Ecuador lost two-thirds of the Oriente Peru gained territory in open disobedience of the Pan American Pacts of 1933 and 1938, which “condemned the acquisition of territory by military occupation or any other means of force by another state directly or indirectly, on any ground whatever.”[30]
The 1995 war between Ecuador and Peru ended thanks to the intervention of the four guarantor countries – the United States, Chile, Brazil, and Argentina,- and also thanks to the rapid intervention of the Organization of American States (OAS). Liberals believe that international organizations can play a key role in settling disputes. Furthermore, they believe that international organizations help to improve the relationship among nations by creating international law, creating acceptable norms of behavior, and promoting certain values that facilitate the interaction between and among independent sovereign states. Therefore, for liberals international organizations “are the primary means for mitigating the danger of war, promoting the development of shared norms and enhancing order.”[31]
According to liberals, “international institutions can make international cooperation easier to attain than in their absence.”[32] Therefore, in explaining the 1995 war liberals would argue that the role of the guarantor countries and the rapid intervention of the OAS was effective because this time there were fewer casualties, and there was no lost of territory in neither side. They will also point out that during this war the role that the OAS and the guarantor countries play was bigger than it was during the war of 1981. With regards to the role of the guarantor countries, liberals would correctly claim that in 1995 the guarantors played a bigger role and “were determined to assist Peru and Ecuador in achieving a definite resolution to their border problem.”[33] This increasing role of IOs in helping to end conflicts is seen with optimism by liberals, because it confirms its utility.
Besides the OAS, liberals can also argue that other international organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank somehow help to settle the dispute in 1995 because these organizations helped to facilitate the negotiations by offering to the parties “some sorts of financial incentives, such as debt reduction or financial aid”[34]
Despite the willingness of international organization to cooperate in settling disputes, liberals do recognize that “there are still significant barrier to achieve collective action.”[35] Nevertheless, they will argue that Peru and Ecuador “have attempted to settle their differences through negotiations, treaties, and arbitration[36] which were made possible thanks to the significant role that IOs played, especially the role played by the OAS.
For realists, the role that IOs can play is mixed. Realists see IOs as agencies that take away the sovereign power of the states; therefore they can be detrimental to national security. But realists also believe that IOs can be used by the state as powerful tools; to gain power, to advance the national interest, to defend itself from aggressors, and to gain favorable treatment through collective action. Therefore, just like when dealing with international law, according to realists states will chose to obey the mandates of IOs when it is in their self-interest to do so.
In relation to the 1995 war, realist would recognize that the OAS and the guarantor countries did succeeded in restoring peace but they will criticize the same organizations on the grounds that they were “unsuccessful in helping the parties to resolve the dispute itself.”[37] Because the results of IOs are not always successful in dealing with the issues at hand, realists are always skeptical of the real value of these organizations in helping to solve a problem.
The liberal claim that individuals are the most important actors in international relations seems not to be true at least when dealing with a war crisis. Both governments from Ecuador architect Sixto Duran Ballen and from Peru Alberto Fujimori arguably acted not in their self-interest but as realists would claim in their national interest. That these two leaders acted on behalf of their national interest can be confirmed by the role that the clergy, scholars, professionals, military personal, and experts played during the 1995 conflict, and then in the peace negotiations that took place in Itamaraty Brazil where the parties signed the Peace Accord of Itamaraty along with the guarantors in February 17, 1995.
Conclusion
From the point of view of realists the conflict between Ecuador and Peru can be explained by the nature of the structural system. Anarchy or the lack of a central authority led to conflict in 1941, when Ecuador lost two-thirds of the disputed territory, then the Paquisha War in 1981, and finally the Cordillera del Condor War in 1995. Evidenced indicates that consistent with the realist claim the parties respected international law when it was in their interest to do so. Peru violated international law by annexing new territory despite the prohibition to do so for part of the Pan American Pact. Ecuador claimed that the Rio Protocol was null when it felt that it can have an advantage over Peru, but then when things were study carefully, and when Ecuador realized that Peru might have the capacity for a full invasion it recognized the validity of the Treaty and sought help from the OAS. Consistent with the realist claim that international institutions do not changed state behavior, both countries acted not according to the prescribed mandates of IOs but according to their power, and their self motivation. Furthermore, the evidence shows that states sought the help of international organization when they felt that it can be convenient, or when they were unable to deal with the problem by themselves. This behavior confirms that realist claim that states use IOs as tools to advance their own agendas.
According to liberals war between Ecuador and Peru did occur but not as the result of anarchy, but as the result of misunderstandings, miscommunications, and the lack of transparency in the Cedulas emitted by the King of Spain which were supposed to divided the territory and avoid conflicts. Liberals can also explain the conflicts between these two countries by referring the sad true that both states at certain times chose not to respect international law and the mandates of IOs. Compliance with international law and IOs according to liberals is not because Ecuador and Peru felt that they can take advantage or use these organizations as tools to advance their own agendas but because both countries know that they will have a continuous interaction and that they will be better off by complying that by cheating.











Bibliography
Folker-Sterling Jennifer. Making Sense of International Relations Theory. Colorado USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
Forde, Steven. “Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli.” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2, May, 1992: Cambridge University Press.
Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve. Explaining and Understanding International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press.
Maier, Georg. “The Boundary Dispute Between Ecuador and Peru.” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 63, No. 1 January, 1969. Published by: American Society of International Law.
Mearsheimer, J. John. “The Tragedy of Great Powers.” Published by: University of Chicago. (class handout)
Mingst, A. Karen and Karns, P. Margaret. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Colorado USA: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc.
Mingst, A. Karen and Karns, P. Margaret. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Colorado USA: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc.
Scott Palmer, David. “Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict: Missed Opportunities, Misplaced Nationalism, and Multilateral Peacekeeping.” Journal of International Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3 Autumn, 1997. Published by: School of International Studies, University of Miami.
Shimko, L. Keith. “Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism.” The Review of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 Spring 1992: Cambridge University Press.

[1] Maier, Georg. “The Boundary Dispute Between Ecuador and Peru.” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 63, No. 1 January, 1969. Published by: American Society of International Law. P 28
[2] Ibid. p 30
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid. p 33
[7] Ibid. p 35
[8] Hollis, Martin and Smith, Steve. Explaining and Understanding International Relations. New York: Oxford University Press. P 29
[9] Maier. p 43
[10] Mingst, A. Karen and Karns, P. Margaret. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Colorado USA: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc p 39
[11] Maier. p43
[12] Scott Palmer, David. “Peru-Ecuador Border Conflict: Missed Opportunities, Misplaced Nationalism, and Multilateral Peacekeeping.” Journal of International Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 39, No. 3 Autumn, 1997. Published by: School of International Studies, University of Miami. p 112
[13] Forde, Steven. “Varieties of Realism: Thucydides and Machiavelli.” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2, May, 1992: Cambridge University Press. p 387
[14]Folker-Sterling Jennifer. Making Sense of International Relations Theory. Colorado USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. p30
[15] Maier. p 44
[16] Folker-Sterling. p 15
[17] Shimko, L. Keith. “Realism, Neorealism, and American Liberalism.” The Review of Politics, Vol. 54, No. 2 Spring 1992: Cambridge University Press. p 293
[18] Maier. p 30
[19] Mearsheimer, J. John. “The Tragedy of Great Powers.” Published by: University of Chicago. (class handout) p 32
[20] Scott Palmer. p 115
[21] Ibid. p 121
[22] Ibid. p 119
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid. 113
[25] Ibid.
[26] Ibid. p 111
[27] Ibid. p 124
[28] Ibid. p 112
[29] Maier. p 44
[30] Ibid.
[31] Mingst, A. Karen and Karns, P. Margaret. International Organizations: The Politics and Process of Global Governance. Colorado USA: Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc. p 38
[32] Folker-Sterling. 62
[33] Scott Palmer. p 110
[34] Ibid. p 128
[35] Folker-sterling. 57
[36] Maier. p 28
[37] Scott Palmer. p 115